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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Appealed from the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in 
and for the County of Latah 
HON. JOHN R. STEGNER, DISTRICT JUDGE 
LAWRENCE WASDEN 
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DENNIS BENJAMIN 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Filed this_ day of _____ , 2014. 
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Dale C. Shackelford 
#64613 / ICC 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
PETITIONER, prose 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE C. SHACKELFORD, ) 
Petitioner, 
) 
CASE No. CV-2001-4272 ) 
) NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF v. ) 
) 
PROPOSED STIPULATIONS. 





On January 30, 2012, Petitioner in the above-styled case submitted a 
MOTION FOR REVIEW BY DISTRICT COURT OF PROPOSED STIPULATIONS, with a copy of 
the same served by US mail to the State of Idaho, Respondent - specifically, 
upon William Thompson, Jr., Latah County Prosecuting Attorney. 
Having received no response whatsoever either from the Court or the 
State, nor any entry in the Register of Actions indicating that a response has 
been made, all proposed stipulations contained within the aforementioned 
Motion/proposal are hereby WITHDRAWN. 
Respectfully submitted this ·---
-----·\ dayof~t~ 
~ Shackelfo'td 
/PETITIONER, pro se. 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF PROPOSED STIPULATIONS l 
Dale C. Shackelford 
#64613 / ICC 
P.O. BOX 70010 
BOISE ID 83707 
NO 
I I: 55 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) CASE NO. CV-2001-4272 
) 
v. ) 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF ) 
) COUNSEL & EVIDENTIARY 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) HEARING ON POST-CONVICTION 
) PETITION. 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, prose, and moves this Court to appoint counsel 
to represent him in the above-styled case pending in this court. Petitioner 
has alleged facts within the petition that raise the possibility of valid 
claim(s), and the district court should therefore give the petitioner an 
opportunity to work with counsel and properly allege the necessary supporting 
facts (GONZALES v. STATE, 151 Idaho 168, 254 P.3d 69 (2011)). Petitioner has 
been declared indigent at all stages of these proceedings and hereby states 
that he remains so, and can not afford the cost of counsel to represent him in 
these matters. 
Petitioner would request that upon appointment of counsel that an 
Evidentiary Hearing be scheduled so as to hold such a date on the Court's 
calendar in the event matters arise that are necessary to be determined by the 
court in ruling on the petition pending in this case. 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL & EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON POST-CONVICTION PETITION - l 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS DAY OF , 2012. 
lC2 :C]7-~;J~J 
Dale C. Shackelford· 
PETITIONER, prose 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL & EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON POST-CONVICTION PETITION -
2 
Dale C. Shackelford 
#64613 / ICC 
P.O. BOX 70010 
BOISE, ID 83707 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 




V • ) 
) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
Case No. CV-2001-4272 
MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, prose, and moves this Court to take judicial 
notice of the following Latah County cases pursuant to I.R.E. 201: STATE v. 
SHACKELFORD, CR00-00260; STATE v. MARY ABITZ, CR00-00262; STATE v. SONJA 
ABITZ, CR00-00263; STATE v. BERNADETTE LASATER, CR00-00264 and STATE v. MARTHA 
MILLAR, CR00-02022. 
Petitioner states the records requested contain data relevant to the 
claims set forth in the [Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed 
contemporaneously herewith, and granting this motion would be in the interest 
of party and judicial economy. 
Dated this ~ Day of ~l.J 
+lOT!ON TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE - 1 
20l{fl£-I SrJ~1 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE C. SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 













Case No. CV-2001-4272 
ORDER VACATING HEARING 
On August 6, 2012, the Petitioner, Dale C. Shackelford, filed a Notice of 
Hearing, which stated that his pending motions would be heard by this Court on 
August 27, 2012, at 9:00 a.m. The Petitioner did so without consulting this Court as 
to its schedule. Due to a conflict with this Court's schedule, the Petitioner's motions 
will not be heard at the time indicated in the Petitioner's Notice of Hearing. If the 
Petitioner wishes to schedule a hearing on his motions, he will need to contact the 
ORDER VACATING HEARING Page 1 
Clerk of the Court to secure a time that is convenient for this Court and counsel for 
the State. 
Good cause appearing, 
It is ORDERED, that the hearing on the petitioner's post-conviction motions, 
which was set by the Petitioner sua sponte for August 27, 2012, at 9:00 a.m., is 
VACATED. 
Dated this Bay of August 2012. 
Jo:ii R. Stegner 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete, and correct copies of the foregoing 
Order were delivered by the following methods to the following: 
Dale C. Shackelford 
I.C.C. #64613 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
William W. Thompson, Jr. 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
On this day of August 2012. 
ORDER VACATING HEARING Page 2 
.[--1 U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax 
-V] Hand Delivery 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
(208) 883-2246 
ISB No. 2613 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
RESPONSE TO: MOTION TO RESUME 
PROCEEDINGS, MOTION FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING, MOTION 
TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE AND 
MOTION TO AMEND [SUCCESSIVE] 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
COMES NOW the Respondent State of Idaho, by and through the Latah County 
Prosecuting Attorney, and respectfully responds to the following: 
Motion to Resume Proceedings, 
Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Evidentiary Hearing on Post-
Conviction Petition, 
Motion to Take Judicial Notice, 
Motion to Amend [Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
all dated July 5, 2012, and filed with the Court on or about July 11, 2012. 
RESPONSE TO: MOTION TO RESUME PROCEEDINGS, 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING, MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL 
NOTICE AND MOTION TO AMEND "[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF" -1 
In light of this Court's July 8, 2011, 110rder Suspending Petitioner's [Successive] 
Petition, Denying His Motion for Leave to File Addendum, and Denying the State's 
Motion for Summary Disposition,'1 and the subsequent resentencing of Petitioner on 
Counts I and II (Murder in the First Degree) occurring on the 28th day of September 
2011 (the convictions and sentences in all of the other counts having previously been 
upheld following both post-conviction and appellate proceedings), it is appropriate for 
the Court to resume proceedings herein. To that end, the State incorporates as if fully 
set out at this point, the State's April 11, 2011, 11 Answer to'[Successive] Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief'" and the State's May 6, 2011, "Motion for Summary Disposition." In 
sum, Petitioner's 11 [Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" fails to raise any 
issues that were not or could not have been raised in the prior appeals and post-
conviction proceedings herein and, consequently, Petitioner is not entitled to pursue 
any further relief. 
As to Petitioner's proposed "Amended [Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief" for which Petitioner now seeks permission to file, the only arguably new claim is 
found at page 33 and designated "VI. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF POST-
RESPONSE TO: MOTION TO RESUME PROCEEDINGS, 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING, MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL 
NOTICE AND MOTION TO AMEND "[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF" - 2 
CONVICTION/UNIFIED APPELLATE COUNSEL DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW. 11 
The Idaho Supreme Court's remittitur finalizing the original combined appeals 
and post-conviction issues in the underlying criminal case was issued on March 21, 
2011. Petitioner's newest claim was not filed until July, 2012, more than two and one-
half months after the one year time period specified in Idaho Code 19-4902(a). In fact, 
the time period for filing a successive petition may actually have begun much earlier in 
this case - e.g. when the Appellate briefs were filed years ago. See Pizzuto v. State, 146 
Idaho 720, 727 (2008) where the Idaho Supreme Court held that the forty-two day post-
conviction time period in capital cases under Idaho Code 19-2719 commences when the 
petitioner "knew or reasonably should have known of the claim ... ". Although the 
Pizzuto case dealt specifically with Idaho Code 19-2719 proceedings (which the Court 
has already ruled are not applicable in the current case since it is no longer a death 
penalty case), the analysis is the same and, by analogy, any attempts to seek additional 
post-conviction relief in this case would necessarily have to be filed within one year of 
when Petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of the alleged appellate/ post-
conviction counsels' ineffective assistance. On the face of Petitioner's proposed 
RESPONSE TO: MOTION TO RESUME PROCEEDINGS, 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING, MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL 
NOTICE AND MOTION TO AMEND "[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF" - 3 
11 Amended [Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief/ the alleged failures of 
appellate/ post-conviction counsel 11 to investigate, research or consider valid, colorable 
claims upon which relief sought herein might have been granted
11 would have 
necessarily been known to Petitioner well prior to the time of the Supreme Court 
remittitur because, as alleged by Petitioner, 11 counsel had 'put off' raising various claims 
with the understanding that the claim(s) would (only) be cognizable in the 
1next1 phase 
of review ... (w)hen Shackelford attempted to raise claims pro se because (post-
conviction) counsel failed to raise [them], this Court precluded Shackelford from filing 
pro se claims at all. 11 Petitioner's proposed 11 Amended [Successive] Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief II at 33. Petitioner's claims are, therefore, untimely and should be 
dismissed. 
Furthermore, to the extent that Petitioner's conclusory allegations attempt to 
raise issues that have been or could have been previously raised, it is untimely and 
should be barred as a matter of law. Additionally, a claim of ineffective assistance of 
post-conviction relief is not cognizable as an independent claim in a successive post-
conviction petition. Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494, 496-97, 887 P.2d 39 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Successive post-conviction petitions for relief must provide "substantive grounds for 
RESPONSE TO: MOTION TO RESUME PROCEEDINGS, 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING, MOTION TOT AKE JUDICIAL 
NOTICE AND MOTION TO AMEND "[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF" 4 
relief" and not a bare claim of ineffective assistance. Id. (quoting Wolfe v. State, 113 
Idaho 337, 743 P.2d 990). The court cannot begin to contemplate whether assistance was 
ineffective without first being provided with proof of substantive grounds for relief and 
evidence showing that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise those grounds. Id. at 
497. The Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is void of 
any grounds upon which the court can grant relief and must be dismissed. 
Finally, Petitioner's claim is conclusory and vague and summary dismissal is 
likewise appropriate. This is particularly true given the fact that Petitioner is 
attempting to attack the effectiveness of his appellate/ post-conviction counsel. As the 
United States Supreme Court has observed, although the Strickland v,. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984) standard for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel applies in the 
appellate arena and while it is still possible to raise ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel claims, "it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was incompetent." Smith v. 
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000) (referring to Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 
1986) by way of example: "Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger 
than those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be 
overcome"). As observed by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 
RESPONSE TO: MOTION TO RESUME PROCEEDINGS, 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING, MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL 
NOTICE AND MOTION TO AMEND "[SUCCESSIVE} PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF" - 5 
11In many instances appellate counsel will fail to raise an issue because she 
foresees little or no likelihood of success on that issue; indeed, the 
weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks 
of effective appellate advocacy ... Appellate counsel will therefore 
frequently remain above an objective standard of competence (prong one) 
and have caused her client no prejudice (prong two) for the same reason -
because she declined to raise a weak issue. 11 Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 
1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Consequently, pursuant to Idaho Code 19-4906(c), Respondent respectfully 
submits that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
As to the balance of Petitioner's above-referenced filings: 
1. As the Court has previously found in its May 3, 2011, 110rder Denying 
Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel 11 and July 8, 2011, 110rder Deny 
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration," a petitioner in post-conviction proceedings 
does not have an absolute right to counsel at public expense. Rather, according to 
Idaho Code 19-852(b )(3), a petitioner in post-conviction proceedings is only entitled to 
representation at public expense if the proceeding is such 11 that a reasonable person with 
adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore (not) a 
frivolous proceeding.'' This Court further addressed the untimeliness of Petitioner's 
successive filings and concluded that Petitioner was not entitled to counsel. The State 
RESPONSE TO: MOTION TO RESUME PROCEEDINGS, 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING1 MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL 
NOTICE AND MOTION TO Al\1END "[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF" - 6 
respectfully submits that nothing new has been presented to the Court to alter that 
previous decision. 
As to Petitioner1s 11 Motion to Take Judicial Notice 11 and 11 Motion for Evidentiary 
Hearing'' the State respectfully submits that those issues are moot given the untimely, 
conclusory and vague nature of the Petitioner1s allegations. 
Based on the above, Respondent again respectfully submits pursuant to Idaho 
Code 19-4906(c) that Petitioner has failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact and 
that Respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
DATED this_~_ 
RESPONSE TO: MOTION TO RESUME PROCEEDINGS, 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING, MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL 
NOTICE AND MOTION TO AMEND "[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF" - 7 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO: 
MOTION TO RESUME PROCEEDINGS, MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
COUNSEL AND EVIDENTIARY HEARING, MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE 
AND MOTION TO AMEND "[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF" was 
~ mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
hand delivered 
__ sent by facsimile, original by mail 
to the following: 
Dale Carter Shackelford #64613 
ICC 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
Dated this 0~ day of August, 2012. 
RESPONSE TO: MOTION TO RESUME PROCEEDINGS, 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING, MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL 
NOTICE AND MOTION TO AMEND "[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF" - 8 
4 
Dale C. Shackelford 
#64613 / ICC 
P.O Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
PETITIONER, prose 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE C. SHACKELFORD, ) 
) Case No. CV-2001-4272 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
v. ) PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF PENDING 




COMES NOW THE PETITIONER, prose, and moves this Court to summarily rule 
upon [ ONLY] the Petitioner's pending Motion for Appointment of Counsel -
without hearing - so that in the event the motion is granted, appointed 
counsel will have opportunity to prepare, amend, supplement and/or argue the 
balance of the motions pending before this court. 
As a prose litigant, Petitioner asserts that counsel should be appointed 
and afforded an opportunity to fully develop those claims such as are 
necessary to comply with minimal pleading standards, and to argue any 
procedural matters, especially those set forth in Petitioner's [original] 
successive petition for post-conviction relief [pages 4 - 7], ( incorporated 
herein by reference). 
Petitioner would also request this Court take judicial notice that the 
very same counsel who represented the Petitioner on the original petition for 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF PENDING MOTION FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 1 
Ii: 30 
post-conviction relief (upon whom, in part Petitioner claims ineffective 
assistance of counsel) currently represents the Petitioner on direct appeal 











assistance of counsel, while the inability of the Petitioner to contact 
conflict (original direct appeal) appellate counsel, and lack of access to 
legal research materials have further reduced pro se Petitioner's 
opportunities to set forth the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claims which 
have been outlined in the Petitioner's Amended [Successive] Petition for 
Post-conviction Relief. Appointment of counsel on this matter would resolve 
each of these issues, and allow each claim presented to be professionally 
vetted and argued before this Court at a date/time set for hearing. 
Petitioner would also note that the State has filed a Motion to Vacate 
and Reset Hearing in regards to the hearing Noticed up by the Petitioner 
(through the Court Clerk) for October 29, 2012. Petitioner would not object to 
a resetting of the hearing (date) on [remaining] pending motions upon the 
appointment of counsel in this matter, with a new date to be scheduled by said 
counsel at a time and date available thereafter. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays this Court will summarily rule upon the 
Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and to reset the hearing date/time for the 
remainder of the pending motions. 
~ 
Respectfully submitted this ,;21 day of I 2012. 




PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF PENDING MOTION FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify by my signature below that I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of tl-:e foregoing by placing same in the U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed to: 
Mr. William Thompson 
Latah County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Attorney for Respondent 
On this ~c,'1'-- day of ,~wt- / 2012. -~ t6) . A_'__}) 
· Dale c. Shackelfo7 .,. 
Petitioner, prose 
#64613 / ICC 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
CASE ~JO ~?,Q .L .... 
LAT AH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
MoscovV,Idaho 83843-0568 
(208) 883-2246 
ISB No. 2613 
2012 -7 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-2001-04272 
RESPONSE TO 11 PETITIONER1S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION OF PENDING 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
COUNSEL" 
37 
COMES NOW the Respondent State of Idaho, by and through the Latah County 
Prosecuting Attorney, and respectfully submits the follovVing factual clarification for the 
Court1s consideration in revievVing the 11Petitioner1s Motion for Summary Disposition of 
Pending Motion for Appointment of Counsel 11 dated August 29, 2012. 
In his filing, Petitioner represents 11that the very same counsel vVho represented 
the Petitioner on the original petition for post-conviction relief (upon vVhom, in part 
Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel) currently represents the Petitioner on 
RESPONSE TO "PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF PENDING MOTION 
FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL" - 1 
direct appeal (from resentencing). 11 According to the Office of the Idaho Attorney 
General, this representation is only partially true. While it is true that the State 
Appellate Public Defender is representing Mr. Shackelford in the current resentencing 
appeal, and that the State Appellate Public Defender represented Mr. Shackelford 
during the post-conviction proceedings stemming from the original death sentence, 
they did not represent him on appeal; rather, he was represented by Leo Griffard. 
Given this, Respondent questions how there could be either a "de facto" or other conflict 
that "has hampered/muted" Petitioner's "abilities to completely detail each 
action/ inaction constituting the basis for the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel . 
• • 
11
• Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition of Pending Motion for Appointment 
of Counsel at 2. The Attorney General's Office further advises that if the Court 
determines there is an actual conflict they will explore the possibility of asking that the 
State Appellate Public Defender be replaced in the current resentencing appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this i 'fL day of September, 2012. 
RESPONSE TO "PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF PENDING MOTION 
FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL" - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO 
"PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF PENDING MOTION 
FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL" was 
./ mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
hand delivered 
__ sent by facsimile, original by mail 
to the following: 
Dale Carter Shackelford #64613 
ICC 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
Dated this ___ day of September, 2012. 
RESPONSE TO "PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF PENDING MOTION 
FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL" - 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
V. 








) _________ ) 
Case No. CV-2001-004272 
ORDER VACATING AND 
RESETTING HEARING 
The above matter having come before the Court pursuant to the motion of the 
Respondent, the Court being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the October 29, 2012, hearing on Petitioner's pending 
motion be and same hereby is vacated and reset to the /2-&!, day of g~ 
2012, at tj:3() o'clock ~.m., /Jac.-,/1,::_, it>1t.<e-
DATED this ;t:i.__i!J day of .~ ,2012. 
Jo~ R. Stegner 
District Judge 
ORDER VACATING AND RESETTING HEARING: Page -1-
1 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the ORDER VACATING AND 
RESETTING HEARING were served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Dale C. Shackelford #64613 
ICC 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
William W. Thompson, Jr. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
.,..H-tf.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[] Fax 
. [ ] Hand Delivery 
[] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight :tvfail 
[]~ 
Moscow, ID 83843 ..f:rHand Delivery 
a-~ /1,;,xeeL Yz:; J:~ s~ L. 9n15 
/?CJ~v-/~ Uf[ 33u- /• 
Dated this ~ day of ~ , 2012. 
ORDER VACATING AND RESETTING HEARING: Page -2-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 










) ______________ ) 
Case No. CV-2001-0004272 
[SP-01-00366] 
ORDER VACATING AND 
RESETTING HEARING 
This matter was scheduled for hearing of the petitioner's Motion to Resume 
Proceedings, Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Evidentiary Hearing, Motion to 
Take Judicial Notice and Motion to Amend "[Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief" on December 12, 2012. The Court attempted to initiate a phone conference to 
the Idaho State Penitentiary to join the petitioner in the hearing and was informed 
that the penitentiary was in lockdown and that the petitioner was not available by 
telephone. Good cause appearing, 
It is ORDERED that the hearing set for December 12, 2012, is VACATED and 
RESCHEDULED to commence at 9:30 A.M. on January 16, 2013, in Courtroom #3 of 
the Latah County Courthouse. The petitioner, Dale Shackelford, will be allowed to 
ORDER VACATING AND RESETTING HEARING - 1 
participate by telephone. The Department of Correction shall notify the clerk of this 
of the telephone number to call to join Mr. Shackelford in this hearing. 
DATED this E 1/';y of December 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SER\!lCE 
I do hereby certify that a full, true, complete 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
VACATING AND RESETTING HEARING 
was hand delivered to: 
William W. Thompson, Jr. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
mailed to: 
Dale C. Shackelford #64613 
PO Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
transmitted by facsimile to: 
James Quinn 
Idaho Department of Correction 
(208) 336-9715 
and emailed to: 
Central Records 
centralrecords@idoc.idaho.gov 
on this/2~ of December JQ_ . 







ORDER VACATING AND RESETTING HEARING - 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
- COURT MINUTES -
John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
Date: January 16, 2013 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 












Sheryl L. Engler 
Court Reporter 
R<.!eording: Zi 3/2013-01-16 
Time: 9:34 A.M. 




,Petitioner.p~ticipating by telephone, 
appearing pro se 
S.tate represented by counsel, 
Williani.W. Thompson, Jr., Prosecutor 
~, ' ' ' ' "' ="==========================================- ========' ======== 
Su6Ject of Proceedings: Motion to . Resu!lle 'Prpcfred!~S~, ~otion for App<Sintinent of 
. Counsel . ,f,( 
1 
Byic;lenpai:y · lleatihg . oit Post-Conviction · Petiti(}n, 
Motion to '11~eJ~~icic1f~otke·and Motion to Amend 
(Successive] Pefi;!ion for Post-Conviction Relief 
This being the time fixed pursuant. to order of the Court for hearing of the petitioner's 
Motion to Resume Proceedings, Motion for Appoinhnent of Counsel & Evidentiary Hearing on 
PQft-Cortviction Petition, 'Motion to T;ake J11(ii~ial 0 Notice·and Motion to Amend [Sm;cessive] 
Petitipn for Post-Convicti.on Reye£ ill. this case,~ Court noted the presence of counsel and .the 
lf:lclttidpation by petitioner by phone. . 
i .·. J~etitioner argue<{! in. support of:~. MCJtiQ~ .ts> :R.e~~;Proce~dings. Mr. Tho!Jlf)SOtl 
cori~rred with the motion. Court s~~~djts'inteI1p9rt tb·¥¥e this.proc~eding remain·~msp~ 
unti,Vtl}eappeal of Hie t:1nderlying~;e~eJ1as~et1/<:9µcilµt.Jed. Mr:ThompsOJJ sta~d'. • t 
th~ i~te I1as no objection to the motipll., 1,,1.l.t coiicurred wrth;the ~ourt's logic. Colloquy was lilitl 
~twee11 Court, counsel and the petitioiler. For .reasons ai:~cqlated on the. record, Court Qeni~d 
ti.le peµtioner' s Motion to Resume Proceedings . suspending conclusion of the appellate 
pr~eedirigs. Court asked the State to prepare an order in accordance with its ruling. 









· C10f1/ .M. Nev, Vt::i.Y:5 
2Dl3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-2001-04272 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO RESUME PROCEEDINGS 
18 
On January 16, 2013, Petitioner's "Motion to Resume Proceedings" came on for 
hearing before the Court. The Petitioner appeared telephonically, and Respondent 
appeared through the Latah County Prosecuting Attorney. The Court having heard the 
arguments of the parties, being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's "Motion to Resume Proceedings" is 
denied without prejudice pending the conclusion of appellate proceedings in State of 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
RESUME PROCEEDINGS: Page-1-
7: 59 
Idaho v. Dale Carter Shackelford, Latah County Case No. CR-00-00260, and the filing of 
any post-conviction proceedings relating to or stemming therefrom. 
~ . 
SO ORDERED this \ 1' day of January, 2013, nunc pro tune to January 16, 2013. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 




CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING 
MOTION TO RESUME PROCEEDINGS was 
~mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
hand delivered 
__ sent by facsimile, original by mail 
to the following: 
Dale Carter Shackelford #64613 
ICC 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
Dated this \~ day of January, 2013. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
RESUME PROCEEDINGS: Page -3-
C. Shackelford 
#64613 I ICC 
PETITIONER,pro se 
2013 NOV I 8 AM ti : 4 3 
CLERK DlSTR!CT COURT 
COUNW 
BY ___ ~f'1FP\IT'i 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE C. SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
V. 












Case No. CV-2001-004272 
Notice of Withdrawal of Petitioner's 
Motion to Amend [Successive] Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief 
COMES NOW the Petitioner,pro se, and withdraws his (filed) Motion to Amend [Successive] 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the Amended Petition attached thereto. Petitioner states 
that this Court has not ruled upon said motion since its filing on July 11, 2012 due to the suspension 
of the proceedings in this case, and that the State has not responded to the claims set forth therein. 
Petitioner plans to refile this Motion to Amend [Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
with all claims in the upcoming weeks, after resumption of the proceedings in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this 
Notice of Withdrawal of Petitioner's Motion to Amend [Successive] Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief - 1 
C. Shackelford 
#64613 I ICC 
70010 
ID 83707 
PETITIONER, pro se 
20!3 NOV 18 AM II: 43 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE C. SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
V. 




) Case No. CV-2001-004272 
) Motion to Set a Scheduling Conference 
) 
) 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, pro se, and moves this Court to issue an order, setting a scheduling 
conference in the matters related to the above-styled case, and those related to the recently filed 
Application for Post Conviction Relief (PCR) with the purpose of resuming [ suspended] proceedings 
and determining how such proceedings may be consolidated with newly filed actions (if at all). 
Petitioner would state that the procedural posture of this case warrants such a conference and 
resultant scheduling order as the case is a procedural shambles, unprecedented in the annals of Idaho 
jurisprudence. Holding a scheduling conference would eliminate or at least mitigate any procedural 
matters that remain in question which, if left unresolved, would likely lead to arguments in future 
proceedings about procedural defaults, abandoned claims, etc .. 
Motion to Set a Scheduling Conference - I 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner would request relief as requested. 
Dated this __ day of =------'------- , 20 ):J: 
/,...--~ 1. 7/+> A. ~· ,, l _a:;JJ1 t(J / r I ~-
- Dale~. ;hack~lford -
Petitioner, pro se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify by my signature below that I have mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the 
filings as listed below by causing same to be placed - postage paid into the US mail and addressed to: 
> Motion to Set a Scheduling Conference 
> Notice of Withdrawal of Petitioner's Motion to Amend [Successive] Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief 
William Thompson 
Latah County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843-0568 
(5~ /J:=>iSL,~ b( 
On this day of ______ --________ , 20 I"'>. 
Motion to Set a Scheduling Conference - 2 
c-
(. {5)-
Dale C. Shackelford 
64613 / ICC 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
CASE No. ~Po ( ---W3Le l~ 
. I c_d0L~ l) rd{) ( 2>. I {: 
CLERK OF msrh1cr COURT 
LATAH COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE C. SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. CV-2001-004272 
MOTION TO AMEND [SUCCESSIVE] 
PETITION FOR POST -
CONVICTION RELIEF 
COMES NOW THE PETITIONER, prose, and moves this Court to allow 
the amendment of the [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 15 (a) . Petitioner has 
attached hereto a copy of the amended petition as required. 
{'.,~ 
Respectfully submitted this 3 --- day 
Dale C. Shackelford 
Petitioner, prose 
MOTION TO AMEND [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 1 
Dale C. Shackelford 
64613 / ICC 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83 707 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE C. SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
COUNTY OF ADA 
















CASE NO. CV-2001-004272 
AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] 
PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF 
Dale Carter Shackelford 
(Shackelford), prose, and files this Amended [Successive] Petition 
for Post Conviction Relief. Petitioner hereby incorporates herein by 
reference in its entirety the preceding record in this case (No. 
CVOl-004272) and all exhibits, addendum and matters collaterally 
related thereto as allowed by law and rule. 
AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 1 
Petitioner states that the claims described herein entitle him 
to relief requested pursuant to Article I, § 6, 13 & 18 of the Idaho 
Constitution, and amendments 1, 5, 6, 8 & 14 of the ted States 
Constitution. Petitioner hereby, for each claim presented, preserves 
same for state and federal review. BALDWIN v. REESE, 541 U.S. 27, 
12 4 S . Ct . 13 4 7 ( 2 0 0 4) . 
Petitioner contends that the claims presented herein are 
distinctly different from those ruled upon on the (original) 
application for post-conviction relief under I. C. §19-2719 or upon 
appeal therefrom. To the extent this Court holds any claims, facts 
or prejudice therefrom described as duplicative, the claims are 
presented so as to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity 
to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon 
petitioner's constitutional claims which may have been unclear in 
previous filings. PICARD v. CONNOR, ("[s]tate prisoner [must] 
present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the 
federal courts".) see also, DUNCAN v. HENRY, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 
(1995) (per curium). 
In each of the claims presented infra, Shackelford alleges he 
suffered prejudice, substantial and injurious effects from the 
act (tion) s as described. The errors, combined with the pattern of 
prosecutorial misconduct illustrated herein so infected the 
integrity of the proceedings that it lessened the government's 
burden of proof and thereby denied Shackelford' s Sixth amendment 
right to a fair trial, made applicable pursuant by the Fourteenth 
amendment to the United States Constitution. These errors, in 
affecting the entire adjudicatory framework, are structural, and 
defy analysis by harmless error standards. PUCKET v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 
AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 2 
1423, 1432 (2009) (quoting ARIZONA v. FULMINATE, 499 U.S. 279, 309, 
11 S. Ct. 1246 (1991)). 
Due to Shackelford having been sentenced to death on the two 
(2) First Degree Murder convictions, he was required to comply with 
the provisions of I.C. §19-2719 et seq. and utilize the post-
conviction procedures prior to receiving a direct appeal review. 
This [successive] petition then is best described as an "initial-
review proceeding" as the term is used in MARTINEZ v. RYAN, 566 U.S. 
132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012) in that post conviction counsel failed to 
raise these issues in a timely manner, despite instructions by 
Shackelford to do so. This successive petition must also be 
considered the first opportunity to bring these matters pursuant to 
Idaho Code §19-4901. 
Petitioner hereby incorporates the entire record of this case, 
as styled above, herein in its entirety, including any exhibit to 
and/ or document filed in this case, but not ruled upon by this 
Court. Petitioner notes that judicial notice of the underlying 
criminal case (CR00-00260) has been previously made under this case 
number. 
BACKGROUND 
Shackelford was originally charged by Indictment with two 
counts of First Degree (premeditated) Murder, First Degree Arson, 
Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder, Conspiracy to Commit First 
Degree Arson and Preparing False Evidence in 2000. A jury returned 
verdicts of guilty on all counts, and this Court sentenced 
Shackelford to death for each of the First Degree Murder counts and 
imposed the maximum sentences available on each of the other 
felonies except on the Conspiracy to Commit Murder (C1ount IV), 
which itself carried a maximum sentence of death. Shackelford 
AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 3 
appealed, and because he was sentenced to death, simultaneously 
a post-conviction action pursuant to §19-2719, which 
resulted in the death sentences being set aside. The Court also 
ed claims ated to the other sentences and guilt phase issues 
raised in the petition. 
Shackelford appealed aspects of the rulings made by the trial 
court on post-conviction relief, and the state cross-appealed. The 
Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decisions as to post-
conviction claims, and remanded for a new sentencing on the two 
First Degree Murder counts. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari 
on March 7, 2011, and the Idaho Supreme Court issued a Remittitur. 
In March 2011, Shackelford filed a [successive) petition for 
post-conviction relief along with a motion for appointment of 
counsel. In May 2011, Shackelford filed a motion for leave to file 
an addendum to the petition. In July 2011, this Court issued an 
ORDER suspending the successive petition, denying the motion for 
leave to file the addendum and denying the state's motion for 
summary disposition, all without prejudice. The Court also denied 
without prejudice Shackelford' s motion for appointment of counsel. 
The Court identified the [then] upcoming resentencing as the 
rationale for the decision (ORDER, July 8, 2011, page 6). 
In September 2011, Shackelford was resentenced by this Court to 
consecutive terms of (fixed) life on each of the murder counts. The 
Court appointed the Off ice of the State Appellate Public Defender 
(SAPD) to represent Shackelford on direct appeal on the 
resentencing. That appeal was decided on October 30, 2013 in Idaho 
Supreme Court Case No. 39398-2011 and an [amended] opinion entered. 
Remittitur issued thereafter. 
AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 4 
ISSUES PRESENTED HEREIN 
lL_ THE COURT'S IMPROPER SUBMISSION OF INSTRUCTION No. 33 
(ACCOMPLICE/AIDING & ABETTING) TO THE JURY OVER DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTION WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OR INDICIA OF 
AIDING / ABETTING (ACCOMPLICE) BEING ESTABLISHED BY THE 
PROSECUTION ELIMINATED THE STATE'S BURDEN OF PROOF IN 
PROVING EACH OF THE ELEMENTS TO THE CRIMES UPON WHICH 
DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, THEREBY 
DENYING DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
£h_ DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO TRIAL 
COUNSELS' FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY ARGUE THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
REGARDING THE ACCOMPLICE INSTRUCTION NO. 33. 
£:.. STATE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE TO DEFENSE DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING 
REPORT AND X-RAYS OF VICTIMS CONSTITUTES PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT, RESULTED IN DUE PROCESS VIOLATION, AND RESULTED IN 
PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT. 
!2:._ DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL DUE 
TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO IMPEACH LUCIEN HAAG AND TO 
ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE HIS FINDINGS BY FAILING TO 
INDEPENDENTLY TEST THE BULLETS FOUND IN THE BODIES OF THE 
VICTIMS AND BY FAILING TO INDEPENDENTLY REVIEW THE X-RAYS 
OF THE BULLET FOUND IN THE BODY IDENTIFIED AS DONNA 
FONTAINE. 
E. UNCURED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN VOUCHING FOR THE 
CREDIBILITY OF STATE WITNESSES IN COMBINATION WITH 
INAPPROPRIATELY EMPHASIZING ISSUES RELATED TO DEFENDANT'S 
CHARACTER NOT RELATED TO THE CRIMES CHARGED OR EVIDENCE 
PRODUCED AT TRIAL IN CIRCUMSTANTIAL CASE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT 
OF RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL AS GUARANTEED BY STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 5 
F. SENTENCING BY THE COURT OF THE DEFENDANT TO A TERM OF 
(FIXED) LIFE IMPRISONMENT ON CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT FIRST 
DEGREE MURDER WITHOUT A JURY DETERMINATION OF THE FACTS 
WHICH WOULD ALLOW AN INCREASE IN THE MAXIMUM TERM OF 
IMPRISONMENT VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS AS GUARANTEED BY 
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. 
G. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF POST-CONVICTION/UNIFIED 
APPELLATE COUNSEL DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW. 
AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 6 
LIST OF ATTACHED EXHIBITS 
Exhibit A: Affidavit of Dr. Roderick Saxey Exhibit with attendant 
x-ray (photocopy) of Victim A. 
AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 7 
A. THE COURT'S IMPROPER SUBMISSION OF INSTRUCTION No.33 
(ACCOMPLICE/AIDING & ABETTING) TO THE JURY OVER DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTION WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OR INDICIA OF 
AIDING / ABETTING (ACCOMPLICE) BEING ESTABLISHED BY THE 
PROSECUTION ELIMINATED THE STATE'S BURDEN OF PROOF IN 
PROVING EACH OF THE ELEMENTS TO THE CRIMES UPON WHICH 
DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, THEREBY 
DENYING DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
It is well settled that aiding & abet ting is not a criminal 
offense, but a theory of liability to the commission of a crime 
(STATE v. AYRES, 70 Idaho 18, 25, 211 P. 2d 142 (1949); STATE v. 
JOHNSON, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008); U.S. v. SMITH, 198 F.3d 
377 (2d Cir. 1999)), thus, one can not be convicted of being both 
the principal and the aider & abetter (accomplice) in the same 
criminal act without running afoul of (double jeopardy) protections 
guaranteed 
amendments. 
by the U.S. Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth 
In Idaho, the law specifically limits the classification of 
parties to a crime to the principal and accessories and does not 
recognize accomplice (theory) as a means by which a person may be 
party to a criminal act; I.C.18-203 (1) & (2). As a result, the 
(accomplice theory) Instruction (No. 33) which was submitted to the 
jury at trial and applied to the essential elements to be proven 
against the defendant was improper. 
In each of the crimes upon which the defendant was indicted and 
convicted, Shackelford was charged as the principal, and there was 
no evidence put forth or otherwise established by the state at trial 
that there was an accomplice to the crime(s), thus, the evidence was 
insufficient to have submitted the accomplice theory Instruction 
(No. 33) to the jury. 
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The submission of Instruction No. 33 had the ultimate (and 
udicial) effect of allowing the jury to "invent" or speculate to 
existence of an accomplice, and to assign/impute some, any, or 
1 the essential elements that were required to have been found 
against a single individual to any number of theoretical accomplices 
in the 1 ikeness of a "Chinese Menu 11 (e.g. , actus reus to principal 
on element 1 of count 1 with mens rea to element 3 of count 1 
assigned to accomplice) without finding all the essential elements 
necessary to convict attributable to Shackelford either as the 
principal or accomplice or to any specific [theoretical] accomplice. 
Because of this, the state was relieved of its burden of persuasion 
beyond a reasonable doubt (against the defendant) of every essential 
element of the crime(s) charged. FRANCIS v. FRANKLIN, 471 U.S. 307, 
313, 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985); see In re WINSHIP, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 
S.Ct. 1068 (1970) (holding that due process requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
charged) . 
Further, Instruction No. 33 impermissibly shifted the burden to 
the defendant to prove that an accomplice was not involved in any of 
the criminal acts charged - despite the fact that the accomplice 
theory (instruction) was disclosed to the defendant only after the 
close of all evidence at trial unlike the facts in JOHNSON where the 
proposed jury instructions were submitted prior to trial. The 
variance between the indictment(s) and the verdict misled and 
embarrassed the defendant in the preparation and presentation of the 
defense, making the process fatally defective STATE v. WINDSOR, 110 
Idaho 410, 418, 716 P.2d 1182, 1190 (1985); BERGER v. U.S., 295 U.S. 
78, 82-84 (1935). 
It is presumed that juries follow instructions they are given 
WEEKS v. ANGELONE, 528 U.S. 225, 234, 120 S.Ct. 727, 733 (2000); 
U.S. v. OLANO, 507 U.S. 625, 740, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1781 (1993), thus, 
it is apparent that the jury in the Shackelford trial read and 
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utilized the accomplice instruction (No. 33) which impermissibly 
lowed a finding of guilt even where it was impossible, based on 
the evidence submitted at al, to have found that Shackelford had 
{committed) each of elements set forth the criminal acts 
charged. 
Idaho Code §19-1411 requires certainty in the Indictment by 
mandating that indictment be direct and certain in regards to; (1) 
the party charged, and; (2) the offense charged. While it is settled 
that "one who has been indicted as a principal may be convicted on 
evidence showing only that he aided and abetted the offense" U.S. v. 
INGLESIAS, 915 F.2d 1524, 1528 (11th Cir. 1990) there was no 
evidence at the Shackelford trial alleging, implying or proving that 
there was an accomplice, or that anyone except Shackelford committed 
each act (actus reus) with the (requisite) state of mind (mens rea) 
necessary to convict. Idaho law permits an accessory to a crime to 
be indicted, tried and punished, despite the principal not being 
indicted or tried (I. C. §19-1431) The statutes stand silent as to 
whether an accomplice may be so tried. This is clearly due to the 
fact that accomplice theory in Idaho does not exist in law. 
Submission by the court of jury instruction No. 33, over the 
objection of the defendant provided allowances to the jury which 
obviated the need of each juror to agree upon and/or find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, each essential element - including the elements of 
finding "the defendant, DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD" (as required) 
committed each element of the 
elements of each crime to be 
theoretical accomplices, then 





further di vi ding the mens 
that a single individual, 
rea and 
either 
Shackelford or an accomplice(s) committed all the elements necessary 
to be convicted of a crime, thereby violating due process guarantees 
made by both the state and federal constitutions. 
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Based on the above, Shackelford could be convicted only as 
ither a or an aider/abetter of the criminal acts 
charged, not both, on each of the six (6) counts upon which he was 
cted and t cted. Alternatively, Shackelford must 
be considered no more than an accessory as prescribed by I.C. §18-
205, punishable as prescribed by I.C. §18-206 (see also I.C. §19-
143 0) . 
1}. INSTRUCTION No. 33: IMPACT ON IDAHOS' ALIBI DEFENSE 
STATUTES 
In addition to the above, the allowances made by the wording of 
Instruction No. 33 effectively eliminates(ed) ability of the 
defendant to mount an alibi defense in any case where such language 
is used in a jury instruction. 
As noted in the district court in its MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER REGARDING THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS in denying 
Shackelford's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claim based on 
failure to request an alibi instruction; 
It also would have been inappropriate to instruct the 
on an alibi defense where, as here, the jury 
instructed that [Shackelford] could be found guilty 
aiding and abetting the commission of these offenses. 





Clearly, the de facto elimination [nullification] of the alibi 
defense in every Idaho case by and through the logic that all crimes 
inherently contain aiding and abetting (accomplice) theory, whether 
or not such accomplice theory was charged in the Indictment or any 
evidence even suggesting that there was accomplice was presented at 
trial ( see JOHNSON, supra) could not have been the intent of the 
legislature, nor can such a conflict in (law) stand in light of due 
process rights guaranteed by the state and federal Constitutions. 
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Despite the ruling in JOHNSON (145 Idaho 970) a jury 
instruct constructively amends an Indictment implicates the 
defendant's right to have the grand jury's charges control the 
offense ly tried, U.S. v. JONES, 418 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2005) 
and where a statute specifies certain things, the designation of 
such things excludes all others (Attorney General Opinion No. 94-3 
citing PECK v. STATE, 63 Idaho 375, 120 P.2d 820 (1942)). 
In combination with the fact that Jury (charge) Instruction No. 
42 allows the jury to disregard any (Jury) Instruction(s) where the 
jury finds that even relevant facts do not exist, the state's burden 
of proof was completely eliminated, and Shackelford is due relief 
sought herein. 
2). INSTRUCTION NO. 33: IMPACT ON COUNTS I & II; (PREMEDITATED) 
MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE. 
Counts I and II of the Indictment charging Shackelford as a 
principal with two counts of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE 
(Instructions No. 6 & 7 respectively) precluded the use of the 
(accomplice) instruction (No. 33) by specifically charging 
Shackelford with the actus reus of shooting and killing the victims. 
Because the jury was not instructed as to the limitations on 
attributing this element to the principal and not an accomplice 
based on the Indictment, (variance), the jury was allowed to 
conclude that some theoretical accomplice pulled the trigger, 
despite the explicit charge that Shackelford himself committed the 
homicide (actus reus) The jury was further free to conclude 
( impermissibly) that each of the mens rea elements ( i • e • t 
willfulness, deliberation, premeditation and malice) could be 
assigned or imputed to any number of theoretical accessories, or to 
Shackelford himself, and not limit all the elements required to 
convict to a single individual. Indeed, the trial court, post-
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conviction, correctly realized that the jury instructions, as given, 
did not indicate that the jury had found Shackelford guilty of being 
the ipal in the murders: 
COURT: Well, do I have to find that he actually committed the 
offenses or that he was responsible for the commission of the 
offenses? 
PROSECUTOR: That he's responsible for the commission of those 
offense [sic]. 
COURT: Why doesn't the legislature -
PROSECUTOR: I cannot cite you right now off the top of my head 
what there is, but the finding that the death penalty can be 
imposed, I believe, is- it's my belief looking at cases before 
that he is responsible for those deaths. 
COURT: Well, because I don't think the jury instructions that I 
gave necessarily found that he himself committed the offense, 
but was -
PROSECUTOR: I believe we argued that too, that the jury didn't 
have to find that. 
COURT: I think you did. 
(Latah County Case No. CR00-00260, Tr.p. 5938, ln. 4-20). Even 
the state conceded that there is nothing in the record indicating 
that Shackelford was convicted by the jury as a principal in the 
crimes charged: 
PROSECUTOR: I do not believe that there is adequate - that 
there would be an adequate record to show that the jury found 
Mr. Shackelford directly committed the offense. 
(Latah County Case No. CVOl-004272 [PCR] Hearing 11/16/04; 
Tr.p. 146, ln. 24 - p. 147, ln. 2). Because the actus reus of 
committing the crime charged - as required in the indictments - were 
not found, nor even listed as an element which the jury must find 
before returning a verdict of guilty, the convictions can not stand 
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(variance) . 
In Idaho, 1 acts constituting FIRST DEGREE MURDER are 
contained within I.C. §18-4003 (et seq.), with Murder itself being 
defined in I.C. §18-4001. In both First and Second Degree Murder, 
the mens rea of Malice must be found by the jury, and necessarily 
attributed to the same person to whom the actus reus is assigned. 
Unlike Second Degree Murder however, First Degree Murder requires 
the jury to find the additional (mens rea) elements of 
premeditation, willfulness and deliberation (Instruction No. 13). 
These "states of mind" too are all, individually and collectively, 
necessarily attributable to the actus reus/actor (not to be confused 
with homicide committed during the commission of an underlying 
felony or FELONY MURDER). Because Instruction 33 allowed the jury to 
attribute any, some or none of the mens rea elements to the 
individual to whom the jury attributed the (actus reus) element 
(actually killing the victims) the conviction can not stand. Where 
Malice was not imputed to the (actus reus), neither first nor second 
degree murder convictions could stand. 
In every crime, there must exist a union or joint operation of 
act and intent (or criminal negligence); I.C. §18-114. Because ALL 
the elements of First Degree Murder could not have been 
found/assigned to Shackelford as a matter of fact or law, either as 
a principal or as one among the theoretical accomplices (aider & 
abetter) the convictions must be vacated. 
3). INSTRUCTION NO. 33; IMPACT ON COUNT III ARSON IN THE FIRST 
DEGREE. 
As with Counts I & II, inclusion of Instruction No. 33 and the 
language therein eliminated the burden of the state to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt essential elements of the crime charged in the 
Indictment, and constituted a variance between the Indictment and 
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the verdict. 
Both Instructions No. 18 (Arson Indictment) and No. 19 (jury 
charge) specifically require the jury to attribute the actus reus of 
sett the fire in the garage to Shackelford. Likewise, the mens 
rea of "willfully" setting the fire must be specifically attributed 
to Shackelford ( the defendant, Dale Carter Shackelford, willfully 
[Instruction 19, 14] ) / thus, the accessory theory allowed by 
Instruction No. 33 could not be applied at all to Instruction No. 
19, nor to the charge of Arson as presented in Count III of the 
Indictment. Failure to exclude Count III from the allowances made by 
Instruction No. 33 prejudiced the defendant, constituted fundamental 
error and the conviction must be vacated. 
4). INSTRUCTION NO. 33: IMPACT ON COUNT IV; PREPARING FALSE 
EVIDENCE. 
In Count VI of the Indictment (Instruction No. 2 9) and 
Instruction No. 30 (jury charge) the requisite element that "the 
defendant, Dale Carter Shackelford, willfully prepared false 
evidence" ( Instruction No. 3 0, 13) specifically assigned the actus 
reus of preparing the false evidence, and the mens rea of willfully 
committing the crime specifically to Shackelford. 
In addition to the above, the assignment/allowance of 
accomplice theory to 14 of Instruction No. 30 (i.e., "with the 
intent to produce it or allow it to be produced, for any fraudulent 
or deceitful purpose, as genuine or true") and 15 ("at a grand jury 
proceeding in Latah County which was authorized by law.") allowed 
the jury to again assign accomplice theory to the mens rea (intent) 
to a theoretical person, despite it being unclear to whom the actus 
reus was assigned. 
This variance is particularly prejudicial in that the 
undisputed evidence submitted to the jury was that the [audio tape] 
constituting the false evidence described in the indictment was made 
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(recorded) in the state of Missouri (thus, element/paragraph 2, 
Instruction No. 30 could not have been found as a matter of fact or 
law), and that the tape was turned over to Latah County (Idaho) 
ff's deputies at the request/ ruct of Latah County deputy 
prosecutor Robin Eckmann not by Shackelford but by (co-
defendant) Mary Abitz, This precludes Shackelford from the role of 
actus reus or mens rea on elements to the crime of preparing false 
evidence as either an accomplice or a principal. 
5). INSTRUCTION NO. 33: IMPACT ON COUNTS IV & V CONSPIRACY. 
In Counts IV and V, Shackelford was charged with conspiracy to 
commit (underlying) crimes. In each of these counts of conspiracy, 
the jury was required to find that, in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, Shackelford committed specific overt acts as listed in 
the Indictment (Instructions Nos. 22 & 25) 1 
Instruction No. 24 defines Conspiracy as involving an agreement 
by two or more persons to commit a crime. In combination with 
Instruction No. 33, the jury was allowed to find that if one of the 
other listed co-conspirators (or an unnamed, unindicted co 
conspirator) indeed conspired with another - even where Shackelford 
was not directly or factually involved or had knowledge of any overt 
act(s) that Shackelford could be convicted on the Conspiracy counts 
based on the (accomplice) theory alone. The failure to preclude the 
jury from applying Instruction No. 33 to the facts/elements 
contained within the Conspiracy Instructions/elements included in 
Instructions 22 & 25 eliminated the need of the jury to find, or the 
state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that Shackelford, as 
1 The Indictments required a finding that Shackelford performed [each] of the 
overt acts listed, yet in the jury charge instructions, (Nos. 23 & 26) the jury 
was allowed to return a verdict of guilty having found one of the parties to the 
agreement performed at least one of the [overt] acts listed in the Indictments. 
This variance is prejudicial, reduced the burden of the state to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt facts charged by the Grand Jury in the Indictment - and alone 
constitutes cause to vacate the convictions on Conspiracy. 
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either a principal or an accomplice, committed any of the overt 
acts, or was guilty of the conspiracies as charged in the 
Indictments. The convictions on Conspiracy to Commit First Degree 
Murder and Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Arson t 
vacated. 
fore must be 
The prejudice resulting from the application of Instruction No. 
33 is compounded as it relates to the two conspiracy counts against 
Shackelford in that the conspiracy allegations against the named co-
conspirators were dismissed by the state immediately after 
Shackelford was convicted, giving credence to the allegations that 
the state used the conspiracy counts as a pretext to submit hearsay 
under the co-conspirator exception to hearsay rules. This issue is 
illustrated by the court's colloquy at the sentencing hearing of 
(named/charged co-conspirator) Mary Abitz on November 1, 2001 - just 
one (1) week after Shackelford was sentenced to a (fixed) life term 
of imprisonment on the Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder by 
the same judge (John Stegner): 
COURT: With respect to the accessory to a felony charge, 
I'm having a difficult time differentiating between Sonja 
Abitz and Mary Abitz through I think vigorous 
representation was able to avoid having to plead to that 
offense. Mary Abitz while reluctant to plead to that 
charge, pled guilty pursuant to ALFORD v. NORTH CAROLINA. 
Were it not for Marty Millar recanting her testimony 
earlier on, I would have no difficulty imposing a 
conviction on that charge. Given Marty Millar' s recent 
change in her testimony, I think an appropriate sentence 
is a withheld judgment on that charge. 
PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, which testimony are you referring 
to, if I may ask? 
COURT: Specifically with regard to the testimony at which 
there was involvement by Mary Abitz in a conspiratorial 
fashion. So, I am placing Mary Abitz on 10 years probation 
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on the accessory to murder charge. 
Tr.p. 138, ln. 24 p. 139, ln. 18. STATE v. MARY ABITZ, Latah 
Case No. CR00-00262. 
Based on the facts of this case, were Mary (or Sonja) Abitz -
both integral participants in the alleged conspiracy - found to have 
been either PRINCIPALS or ACCESSORIES to the conspiracy (as allowed 
by Instruction No. 33) , the dismissal of the [arson and murder] 
conspiracy charges against both women left no person with whom 
Shackelford is alleged to have conspired, or could have committed 
the overt acts that Shackelford, as reflected in the record, clearly 
did not, or in some instances, could not have committed, thereby 
eliminating (post trial) any accomplice theory that the jury was 
allowed to utilize to convict Shackelford. 
Because the court allowed hearsay testimony during trial 
pursuant to the co-conspirator exceptions regarding matters said to 
have occurred prior to and after the dates the state alleged the 
conspiracy was in effect, the state's burden of proof, based on the 
application of Instruction No. 33, and supported by Instruction 42 
in combination with the variance between the Indictment and jury 
(charge) instructions, was eliminated, depriving Shackelford of a 
fair trial. 
B. Deprivation Of Effective Assistance Of Counsel Due To 
Trial Counsels' Failure To Adequately Argue The Jury 
Instructions Regarding The Accomplice Instruction No. 33. 
Instruction no. 33 reads: 
The law makes no distinction between a person who directly 
participates in the acts constituting a crime and a person 
who, either before or during its commission, intentionally 
aids, assists, facilitates, promotes, encourages, counsels, 
solicits, invites, helps or hires another to commit a crime 
with intent to promote or assist in its commission. Both 
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can be found guilty of the crime. Mere presence at, 
acquiescence in, or silent consent to the planning or 
commission or a crime is not sufficient to make one an 
accomplice. 
R. Vol. XI, p. 2212.) This instruct is commonly referred to as 
the "accomplice instruction." By giving the accomplice instruction, 
Petitioner has previously argued that the Court allowed him to be 
convicted under an alternative theory against which he had no reason 
to defend. See State v. Chapa, 127 Idaho 786, 788, 906 P.2d 636, 638 
(1995) (holding that Chapa was deprived of due process when the 
State, having charged the commission of only one offense in the 
information, advanced charges of two distinct crimes through 
instructions given to the jury). Petitioner further argued that the 
verdict, based upon Instruction number 33, does not reveal whether 
all the jurors found him guilty of actually committing the crimes or 
found him guilty of intentionally aiding, assisting, facilitating, 
promoting, encouraging, counseling, soliciting, inviting, helping or 
hiring another to commit a crime with intent to promote or assist in 
its commission. This was a violation of Petitioner's constitutional 
right to a unanimous jury verdict. United States v. Garcia-Rivera, 
353 F.3d 788, 792 (9t Cir. 2003). 
Petitioner now provides additional factual and legal support 
for the claim that Instruction no. 3 3 was improperly given. After 
the jury returned its verdict and was discharged, trial counsel had 
a conversation with one of the jurors during which she indicated 
that she voted guilty on the first degree murder charge because of 
Instruction. no. 33. RE: Lori Bruce Note, Steve Mahaffy's Notes, 
packet 17, p. 174. (See Attachment T to Second Addendum to Third 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed with this Court.) 
This note provides tangible evidence that at least one juror would 
have decided differently had instruction no. 33 not been given to 
the jury, and it is important to note that Lori Bruce was not only 
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the forewoman of the jury, she too was employed as a paralegal at a 
local law firm at the time of the trial. This is important because 
Petitioner was entitled to a unanimous jury verdict under Garcia-
Rivera, while Instruction No. 33 created ambiguity and as seen 
below, the evidence did not support a finding that Petitioner could 
be convicted under an aider and abettor theory. 
Petitioner is aware of I.R.C.P. 606(b) that provides a jury 
verdict may not be impeached with a juror's testimony unless 
extraneous prejudicial information was introduced to the jury, or 
where outside information was improperly passed on to a juror. 
Several cases in Idaho have addressed this issue and upheld this 
rule. See State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 38 P.3d 1285 (Ct. App. 
2001); Levinger v. Mercy Medical Center, 139 Idaho 192, 75 P.3d 1202 
(2003); State v. Setzer, 136 Idaho 477, 36 P.3d 829 (Ct. App. 2001); 
Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494, 975 P.2d 782 (1999). However, these 
cases do not present the constitutional considerations that arise in 
Petitioner's case. Where a petitioner can make a substantial showing 
that his constitutional rights were violated, then the rule must 
yield to the rights at stake. See State v. Currie, 812 So.2d 128, 
2000-2284 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/13/02). 
In Currie, the Louisiana Court of Appeals addressed the 
application of La. C.E. Article 606(B) prohibiting a court from 
considering affidavits from jurors that attempted to impeach the 
jury verdict. The court had recognized that in criminal cases, where 
there are additional constitutional considerations, the prohibition 
must yield to a substantial showing that the defendant was deprived 
of his constitutional rights. In Currie, the defendant presented 
affidavits from two jurors regarding lengthy deliberations that were 
rejected by the trial court pursuant to Article 606(B). On appeal, 
the court considered the lengthy deliberations as evidence that the 
juror's ability to be alert and fair decision makers was seriously 
diminished. The court did not resolve the Article 606(b) issue 
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(having found error in another issue), but the court did note that 
the jury lege statute snot absolute. Petitioner submits that 
.R.C.P. 606 (b) is likewise not absolute. Petitioner submits that 
to the many considerable constitut concerns that arose in 
his capital case, he should be permitted to call as a witness or 
provide an affidavit from Ms. Bruce and others at an evidentiary 
hearing. 
Further legal support for this claim is delineated in US. v. 
Delgado, 357 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004). In Delgado, the Ninth 
Circuit held that to support a conviction on the theory of aiding 
and abetting, the State must prove the defendant's specific 
knowledge that the act in question was illegal; 
[I]ndeed, case law establishes that to aid and abet another 
to commit a crime, the government must show not only that 
the defendant participated in the criminal venture, but 
that he intentionally assisted the venture's illegal 
purpose. [id]. (citations omitted). 
In the instant case, given instruction no. 33, it is likely, 
and supported by Lori Bruce's conversation with trial counsel, that 
the jury convicted on the theory of aiding and abetting. However, 
there was no evidence from the State that Petitioner had 
intentionally assisted the alleged crimes' purpose. Thus, the 
instruction not only misled the jury, but was also unsupported by 
evidence. Due to the Garcia-Rivera violation, violating Petitioner's 
right to a unanimous jury verdict, it is impossible to know whether 
the jury relied upon Instruction no. 33 in finding Petitioner 
guilty. Thus, due to trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to 
object to the instruction, Petitioner was convicted based upon an 
unreliable jury verdict. 
For the reasons set forth above, the language and application 
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of Instruction No. 33, and the submission thereof without sufficient 
to justify its submission to the jury, prejudiced the 
defendant, eliminated the burden of the state to prove beyond a 
reasonable 
constituted 
essent al e ements of the crime charged, 
a variance between the Indictment, the jury 
instructions, and the verdict returned, thus, the conviction must be 
vacated. 
C. STATE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE TO DEFENSE DIAGNOSTIC 
IMAGING REPORT AND X-RAYS OF VICTIMS CONSTITUTES 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, RESULTED IN DUE PROCESS 
VIOLATION, AND RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT. 
On June 1, 1999, radiologist(s) at the St. Joseph Regional 
Medical Center in Lewiston, Idaho, pursuant to orders of Pathologist 
(and state's trial witness) Dr. Robert Cihak, x-rayed the corpse of 
Victim A, subsequently identified as Donna Fontaine and wrote a 
report as to the findings made. 2 
The radiologist's report, along with attendant x-rays were not 
disclosed to the defense before or during trial despite Dr. Cihak 
having testified at trial to facts observed within the x-rays (Tr.p. 
2181, ln. 9 - p. 2182, ln. 17). The report and x-rays were not 
discovered by/to the defendant until late in 2004, well after the 
time the district court precluded Shackelford from raising pro se 
claims within the (original) application for post conviction relief.
3 
2 All arguments and documentation related to the Petitioner's SECOND ADDENDUM TO 
THIRD AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF filed in this action but not 
ruled upon are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety, including 
exhibits/attachments thereto. Petitioner also incorporates the Compact Disk (CD) 
of the x-rays (R. 1857), Diagnostic Imaging Report and the AFFIDAVIT of Dr. 
Roderick Saxey dated 05 May 2005 as contained within this record herein by 
reference. 
3 In its MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER REGARDING THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
entered on April 8, 2005 in the above-styled case, the court held that given the 
limited relevance to the Petitioner's claim that Victim A was not Donna Fontaine, 
that the failure to disclose the Diagnostic Imaging report (and x-rays) would be 
dismissed per the State's request (id at pages 5 - 7). The claim herein however 
reasserts the BRADY, GIGLIO, NAPUE, (et. al.) violations, and asserts prejudice 
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Based on standard autopsy reports disclosed to the defense by 
the state prior to trial, it was known to the defense that the 
weight (mass) of the FULL METAL JACKET(ED) bullet identified by Dr. 
Cihak as having caused the death of Victim A (Tr.p. 2192, ln. 11-12) 
was approximately thirty five percent (35%) less weight(ed) as the 
bullet identified as having killed Victim B - and had lost twenty-
five (25) grains (weight) of it's original seventy-one (71) grains 
(Tr.p. 2475, ln. 22 - p. 2476, ln. 17), despite both bullets having 
been fired from the same gun (Tr.p. 2478, ln. 1-5). All attempts by 
the defense team to reconcile the discrepancy between the weight of 
the (originally identical) bullets went unresolved, utilized 
significant defense resources, and restricted the options relating 
to available defenses. 
Petitioner submits that the State effectively withheld the 
existence of x-rays of the bodies of the two victims. Petitioner 
claims that an expert's opinion stemming from an independent review 
of the x-rays would have cast significant doubt on the State's 
theory, and Lucien Haag's testimony, regarding the cause and/or the 
manner of death. See Gantt v. Roe, 389 F.3d 908, 911-912 (9th Cir. 
2004) (noting that Brady evidence includes evidence that undermines 
the prosecution's theory of the case). 
Based on the radiological report and attendant x-rays, it 
became clear that the bullet with more than a third of its mass 
having been "shearedn away (Tr.p. 2474, ln. 15-18) had struck a very 
hard object before entering the body of Victim A, and had lost a 
considerable amount of velocity prior to penetration of the (neck), 
consistent with a ricochet, a means (of death) in direct 
related to the failure to disclose the report/x-rays, and the bearing such failure 
to disclose had on the defendant's ability to contradict the state's theory of the 
case, the ability to mount a justification, accident or self-defense argument and 
other such collateral matters. 
AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 23 
contradiction to the manner of death espoused by the state to the 
ury of an execution-style slaying: 
PROSECUTOR [Christensen] can also tell you that at some 
point nearby [sic] the time the defendant takes aim with 
Donna's . 32 caliber pistol and essentially executes her 
with a shot to the back of the neck in C4, which Dr. Cihak 
tells you causes almost instantaneous death. 
(Tr. p. 5277, ln. 1-5). 
Petitioner submits that a post-trial, independent review of the 
x-rays dramatically illustrates that the bullet had not been sheared 
or fragmented inside the body of Victim A, nor does the missing 
(mass) appear inside the body (AFFIDAVIT of Dr. Roderick Saxey, 
Exhibit A hereto), thus undermining the testimony of states' witness 
Lucien Haag, as well as the State's theory regarding cause and 
manner of death. Because a full-metal jacketed bullet is 
considerably harder than human cervical (neck) bones, a direct 
strike by such a projectile would have clearly shattered neck 
vertebra, and or passed through the tissue were no bone structures 
impacted. Further, it is clear even to a layman that a human neck 
bone is incapable of shearing/tearing away thirty-five percent (35%) 
of a jacketed round with little more than a stress fracture, and the 
bullet simply "sticking" to the bone (Tr. p. 218 9, ln. 2 13) . 
Petitioner asserts that had the existence of the x-rays been 
disclosed in a timely manner that there is a reasonable probability 
that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Gantt at 
913. 
Petitioner is aware of two sources of information in his trial 
counsels' possession that indicated the existence of the x-rays. The 
first source of information regarding the x-rays was through an 
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Incident Property Summary disclosed by the State which referenced 
location, and thus the existence, of the x-rays. Petitioner 
submits that this summary document, as one of thousands of pages of 
documents sclosed during the course of pretrial discovery, did not 
adequately reveal the existence, location or the exculpatory value 
of the x-ray. The second source of information regarding the x-rays 
was through Dr. Cihak' s grand jury testimony. Petitioner asserts 
that the mere fact that the discovery of exculpatory evidence was 
available through these alternative sources does not relieve the 
State from its obligation to disclose the information. As the Ninth 
Circuit stated: 
While the defense could have been more diligent--and, 
indeed, the defense lawyer's failure to investigate the 
[evidence at issue] himself is part of petitioner's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim--this does not 
absolve the prosecution of its Brady responsibilities. As 
the Supreme Court reiterated just last Term, "[a] rule 
declaring 'prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek, ' is 
not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord 
defendants due process. 11 BANKS V. DRETKE, 540 U.S. 668, 124 
S.Ct. 1256, 1275, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004). 
GANTT V. ROE, 389 F.3d at 913. 
Further, both references to the x-rays must be taken in the 
greater context of all the other discovery materials that failed to 
reference them. For example, neither of Dr. Cihak
1 s pathology 
reports made any reference to his decision to order x-rays of the 
bodies. It is within the pathology reports that a reference would 
likely be found. Likewise, the Latah County Sheriffs' Office (LCSO) 
report prepared by Detective Hall during this time frame indicated 
that he and Mr. Christensen spoke to Dr. Cihak at his office, and 
while mentioning Dr. Cihak' s review of the gastric contents, fails 
to make any reference to the x-rays which apparently Detective Hall 
took at that time and subsequently entered into evidence, but never 
according to the prosecutors turned the x-rays, or documents 
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attached thereto over to the state; rather, Detective Hall simply 
aced the documents in the LCSO evidence room. 
In ct ion state conceded the 
[Diagnostic Imaging] report and x-rays were booked into evidence at 
the Latah County Sheriff's Off ice, but were never added to the 
prosecutor's file and as a result, [petitioner's] trial counsel 
never saw it (MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER REGARDING THE STATE'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS, page 5). The state argues that the evidence was 
placed on a list of all other evidence collected by the Latah County 
Sheriff's Department, and that that list was disclosed to the 
defense team, however, Chief Deputy Prosecutor Robin Eckmann 
represented to the district court on November 15, 2004 that neither 
she, nor the prosecution had a copy of the evidence, but had "first 
read itn as an attachment to Petitioner's Response to State's Motion 
to Dismiss (R. 1857), (Tr.p. 458, ln. 23 - p. 459, ln. 7 CVOl-
004272). Petitioner leaves it to the Court to determine the 
credibility of Chief Deputy Prosecutor Eckmann's statement, but 
would point out that if the lead prosecutor in the case was unaware 
of the existence of the diagnostic imaging report and x-rays prior 
to or during trial, there is little to no possibility that defense 
counsel knew of it either. 
Due to the clear and convincing nature of the report and x-rays 
indicating a ricochet of the bullet prior to entering the body of 
Donna Fontaine which contradicts the state's allegations that 
Shackelford killed Donna Fontaine with an execution-style shot to 
the back of the neck, there is a reasonable probability that the 
jury would have returned a verdict other than First Degree Murder. 
The State has a duty to disclose evidence that is both 
favorable and material either to guilt or punishment of the 
defendant BRADY v. MARYLAND, 3 73 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 ( 1963) ; 
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GIGLIO V. U.S. I 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763 (1972). Whether 
suppression is willful or inadvertent is of no consequence. NAPUE V. 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173 (1959). 
, the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence favorable to the 
accused extends to information known only to police STATE v. 
GARDNER, 126 Idaho 428, 433, 885 P. 2d 1144 (Ct .App. 1994) ; JACKSON 
v. BROWN, 513 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). Where a reviewing court 
finds a material BRADY/GIGLIO violation, and the suppressed evidence 
is not merely cumulative, there is no need for a harmless error 
review, KYLES v. WHITLEY, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). 
D. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL DUE 
TO TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO IMPEACH LUCIEN HAAG AND TO 
ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE HIS FINDINGS BY FAILING TO 
INDEPENDENTLY TEST THE BULLETS FOUND IN THE BODIES OF THE 
VICTIMS AND BY FAILING TO INDEPENDENTLY REVIEW THE X-RAYS 
OF THE BULLET FOUND IN THE BODY IDENTIFIED AS DONNA 
FONTAINE. 
Petitioner submits that had trial counsel conducted an adequate 
investigation, then they would have been able to impeach and 
undermine the validity of Lucien Haag 1 s testimony regarding the 
manner of the victims 1 deaths. 
Lucien Haag testified for the State that the .32 caliber bullet 
found in the female body, Exhibit 29, was, in his view, probably the 
same size as the bullet found in the male body before it lost its 
weight, suggesting that the bullets had been fired from the same gun 
(Tr., p. 2476, Ls. 10-17; p. 2479, Ls. 14-20). Though he testified 
that some of the bullet had been sheared or shaved away, he could 
not provide any explanation as to why it had received such impact 
damage (Tr., p. 2474, Ls. 16-18; p. 2475, Ls. 12-16.) Mr. Haag 
identified the bullet as a full-metal jacketed bullet, describing it 
as "a fairly hard, basically ceramic-like material. 11 (Tr., p. 2476, 
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Ls. 4-5.) Thus, the bullet found in the neck of the female body 
probably would have been extremely difficult to shear or be shaved 
away. Trial counsel not only failed to address this issue with Mr. 
Haag, but ultimate failed by not having the bullets tested to 
determine if Mr. Haag's assertions were correct. 
The thrust of Mr. Haag 1 s testimony was that the bullet in the 
female body 1 s neck was the same size, and was shot from the same gun 
as the bullet found in the male body. Mr. Haag accounted for the 
different sizes of the bullets by asserting that the bullet found in 
the female body had been fragmented. However, there is no indication 
in either Dr. Cihak 1 s report, Attachment N (Petitioner's Second 
Addendum to the Third Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief), 
or Dr. Mannschreck' s report, Attachment K, (id) that bullet 
fragments were found in the body of Ms. Fontaine. If the State's 
theory is that Ms. Fontaine was shot execution-style, (Tr., p. 5277, 
Ls. 1 5; P. 5976, Ls. 16-18.), and the bullet was fragmented or 
sheared off by the bones in Ms. Fontaine's neck, then one would 
expect bullet fragments to be found in Ms. Fontaine's body. The 
evidence as the record currently shows no fragments in the body. 
Thus the bullet found in Ms. Fontaine most likely would have been 
sheared by something prior to entering her neck consistent with Kay 
Sweeney's testimony. This also coincides with the data provided by 
Dr. Saxey's post-trial review and affidavit specifically a 
ricochet of the bullet prior to the entry of the body. If trial 
counsel had brought this inconsistency to the jury's attention and 
independently reviewed the x-rays of the female body, then they 
could have refuted the State I s theory that Ms. Fontaine had been 
killed by an execution-style shot to the neck, and the verdict on 
the First Degree Murder counts would have been different. 
Finally, if the ricochet argument is rejected, because the 
review of the x-rays reveals no bullet fragments in the female body, 
then these bullets were not the same size. If the bullets were not 
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the same size, then they could not have come from the same gun. If 
the bullets did not come from the same gun, then the State's theory 
that one gun was responsible for killing both victims is refuted. 
(Tr., p. 5277, Ls. 1-5; pp. 5279, L.25 - 5280, L. 3; p. 5284, Ls. 8-
10.) Thus, because trial counsel did not challenge Mr. Haag's 
testimony and failed to have the bullets examined by their own 
ballistics expert or the x-rays examined by their own radiologist, 
then trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Because of trial counsels' failure(s), the jury was presented a 
case by the prosecution regarding the bullets and their origination, 
and the manner in which they were fired, without a viable option for 
considering other possibilities, such as accidental death, which 
would have raised a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was responsible 
for their deaths or whether Petitioner's actions/inactions were 
premeditated, or were a result of malice. But for trial counsels' 
ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the jury 
would not have convicted Petitioner of the charged crimes. Because 
of post conviction counsels' failures, these matters have not been 
reviewed by the court more than a decade after the trial. 
E. UNCURED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN VOUCHING FOR THE 
CREDIBILITY OF STATE WITNESSES IN COMBINATION WITH 
INAPPROPRIATELY EMPHASIZING ISSUES RELATED TO DEFENDANT'S 
CHARACTER NOT RELATED TO THE CRIMES CHARGED OR EVIDENCE 
PRODUCED AT TRIAL IN CIRCUMSTANTIAL CASE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT 
OF RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL AS GUARANTEED BY STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
During closing arguments at trial, Deputy Prosecutor Robin 
Eckmann engaged in several instances of "vouching" for the 
credibility of state's witnesses who had testified at trial, thereby 
providing personal assurances and governmental backing of the 
veracity and credibility of those individuals. Eckmann' s comments 
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further tended to convey the impression to jurors that evidence not 
produced at trial, but known to the state supported the charges 
against the defendant. These statements were not cured, mitigated or 
zed by any contemporaneous curative instruction to the jury. 
Further, Eckmann repeatedly and impermissibly demeaned the 
credibility and character of the defendant before the jury. 
Eckmann' s conduct during closing arguments at trial clearly 
constitute misconduct at such a level that (her) actions so infected 
the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a 
denial of due process of law, DARDEN v. WAINWRIGHT, 477 U.S. 168, 
181 (1986); U.S. v. YOUNG, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985). Because the 
judge did not give a contemporaneous curative instruction regarding 
the improper statements and characterizations by the prosecutor, the 
convictions must be vacated. U.S. v. BERMUDEZ, 529 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 
2 O O 8) . (Prosecutor's statement that defendant was lying, especially 
when contrasted with comment that government witness was "absolutely 
believable" was improper. HODGE v. HURLEY, 426 F.3d 368, 377 (6th 
Cir. 2005)). Further, Eckmann's statements which emphasized 
Shackelford's character were improper because such comments were not 
related to the crimes charged or evidence produced at trial in 
defense of the charges (HODGE at 384). 
By and through paragraph 7 of jury Instruction No. 2, the jury 
was advised by the court that: 
Statements, remarks and arguments of the attorneys are not 
evidence, but are for purposes only of assisting the court 
or jury in their respective duties. Any such statement, 
remark or argument which does not conform to the evidence 
or these instructions should be disregarded. 
These two sentences, buried in the seventh paragraph of a 
boilerplate instruction, (No. 2 of 43) in no way cured or mitigated 
the significance of the statements/comments made by Eckmann, and can 
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not be considered at all curative in light of both the impact and 
frequency of the statements made during closing arguments at 
Shackelford's trial: 
> ECKMANN: I also want to talk for a minute about why the 
testimony of Bernadette Lasater and Marty Millar I believe 
is credible and should be believed by you ... 
(Tr.p. 5320, ln. 3-9) 
> ECKMANN: Number one, 
Corroborated is a term 
there' s other evidence 
other evidence exists. 
(Tr.p. 5320, ln. 16-19) 
their statements are corroborated. 
that just means they 1 re backed up, 
that supports what they 1 ve said, 
> ECKMANN: But I would suggest to you that their testimony 
is credible for several reasons. 
(Tr.p. 5320, ln. 13-15) 
> ECKMANN: And Bobby Emily, no reason at all to make this 
up, comes in and testifies before you, under oath ... 
(Tr.p. 5320, ln. 22-24) 
> ECKMANN: Larry Thompson is absolutely telling the truth. 
(Tr.p. 5422, ln. 18-19) 
> ECKMANN: It's the defendant who 1 s lying, not Larry 
Thompson. (Tr.p. 5423, ln. 18-19) 
> ECKMANN: She [Karen Abitz] is telling the truth, and if 
she is telling the truth, the defendant crafted and 
manufactured a complex and intricate lie to cover up for 
this crime, but he can 1 t have it both ways. 
(Tr.p. 5423, ln. 12-15) 
> ECKMANN: He [defense counsel] could not bring himself to 
look at you and tell you that Karen Abi tz was a liar. He 
could not bring himself to do it because she 1 s not. 
(Tr.p. 5423, ln. 8-11) 
> ECKMANN: Well, it's entirely believable to me. (Tr.p. 
5424, ln. 20) 
> ECKMANN: But there are some very important other 
statements this calendar that I think are worth noting, 
which I believe are credible. 
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(Tr.p. 5426, ln. 3-5) 
In a long line of cases, Courts across the nation have 
maintained that a prosecutor may not vouch the credibility of 
witnesses in that such vouching carries with it the imprimatur of 
the government and may induce the jury to trust the government's 
judgment rather than its own view of the evidence (YOUNG, 470 U.S. 
at 18-19). The courts have also recognized that where a prosecutor 
states to the jury that a government witness had no reason to lie, 
that such a statement is improper (U.S. v. WEATHERSPOON, 410 F. 3d 
1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
Although each separate incident of Eckmann' s vouching for the 
credibility of witness is in and of itself prejudicial, the 
cumulative effect of these comments is overwhelmingly prejudicial. 
Nowhere is such a single instance of vouching prejudicial however 
than in the vouching for the credibility of (state witness) Martha 
Millar. The following examples of just how prejudicial Eckmann' s 
vouching for Millar was is reflected in the record of Latah County 
Case No. CR00-02022 at the sentencing hearing of Martha Millar on 
January 24, 2001: 
(BY ECKMANN TO THE COURT) : ... and Ms. Millar exceeded our 
expectations in terms of the value of her cooperation and I 
think the value of her testimony to the prosecution of Dale 
Shackelford. 
(Tr.p. 36, ln. 1-4). The Court made the prejudice even more clear in 
stating: 
COURT (To Martha Millar) : I also sat through the Dale 
Shackelford trial, and I have to say that your testimony 
was undoubtedly very beneficial to the State. Whether Dale 
Shackelford would have been convicted without that 
testimony is, as Ms. Eckmann points out, anyone's guess. 
But I think it will suffice to say that it was instrumental 
in Mr. Shackelford's conviction. 
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(CR00-02022; STATE v. MILLAR, Tr.p. 39, ln. 13-19). 
Compounding the prejudice of Eckmann' s statements, the Court, 
at Shackelford's trial, refused to low defense counsel to present 
to the jury the extent of Martha Millar' s deceit, subterfuge and 
lack of credibility, 
credibility: 
then allowed Eckmann to vouch for that 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, it appears that the prosecutor 
is arguing that if the state puts on a witness and that 
witness is a liar the defense shouldn't be able to expose 
that person as being a liar. Well, that's what cross-
examination and credibility is all about. 
COURT: I don't think there's any doubt in this jury's mind 
that Ms. Millar's an admitted liar, an admitted liar under 
oath, under numerous instances. And the question I'm faced 
with is how many more of those do I allow, and I think it 
is collateral. So I'm sustaining the objection [of the 
prosecutor] 
(Tr. p . 31 71, 1 n. 2 2 - p . 3172 , 1 n. 18) . 
Where prosecutors make statements to the jury which imply a 
personal belief, the Courts have taken a stand (prosecutor's 
statement that defendant was guilty was improper because [it] 
implied a personal belief rather than the government's position. 
U.S. v. SMITH, 982 F.2d 681, 684 (1st Cir. 1993)); (prosecutor's 
statements during closing argument regarding personal opinion of 
defendant's credibility improper. BOYD v. FRENCH, 147 F.3d 319, 328-
29 (4th Cir. 1998)). Robin Eckmann's persistent and straightforward 
personal accusations and opinions that Shackelford was a liar, and 
that Shackelford was not credible was incredibly improper and 
prejudicial (prosecutor's statement describing defendant as a "liar" 
improper because [statement was a] personal opinion regarding 
defendant's credibility; U.S. v GARCIA-GUIZAR, 160 F.3d 511, 520, 
(9th Cir. 1998) amendedby234 F.3d483 (9th Cir. 2000)). This was 
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ironic, and certainly prejudicial in that Shackelford did not take 
the stand to testify at the trial 
As set forth above, Eckmann's (general, negative) 
characterizations of the defendant were improper as well. In 
addition to HODGE, other Courts have addressed the prosecutorial use 
of improper characterizations of the defendant (see e.g.: MALICOAT 
v. MULLIN, 426 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2005). Because the opinions and 
statements made by Eckmann were not in response to [defense] 
counsel's statements, they can not be considered harmless. 
Additional examples of Eckmann' s improper opinions, statements and 
speculations as to the character of the defendant during closing 
arguments are included below: 
> And he [defendant] could not control her with fear and 
intimidation, although, he tried. Despite his best efforts 
he could not control her with threats and with harassment 
and he couldn't stand it. So, ultimately he exercised the 
ultimate control on her. He killed her and he killed the 
man who was with her. (Tr.p. 5302, ln. 6-11) 
> And he [defendant] says that he does it to get her 
[victim] off his back, that's Shackelford truth, but that's 
not truth in the real world. That's not the truth in the 
real world. That was a twisted effort to torment her. 
(Tr.p. 5310, ln. 22-25) 
> [Defendant] Dale's persuasive, Dale is manipulative and 
on top of that Dale is very reassuring. Things will be 
fine, I will not get~ I will make sure you do not get in 
trouble. I will take care of you. When the truth, of 
course, is that Dale Shackelford no more cared for these 
women than he does for the butt of his cigarette that he 
tosses aside and steps on. Once its function is served, 
he's done with it. It can be discarded without further 
thought and moved on to the next useful item. Yet these 
women continued to do what the defendant asked them to do 
and no one benefited from this except the defendant. 
(Tr.p. 5313, ln. 4-15) 
> Why did they do did [sic]? It obviously wasn't the money 
he was paying them, that wasn't a big factor. Sex obviously 
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had something to do with it. But I submit in the end it was 
primarily two factors. Number one, it was the defendant's 
literally astonishing ability to manipulate them. To call 
out of them what he wanted to accomplish in his end. And 
the second thing is his apparent gift for identifying and 
targeting woman [sic] who are likely to go along th that 
type of manipulation. (Tr.p. 5322, ln. 16-25) 
> In fact, this defendant uses people like they were paper 
towels. They're just things he uses, takes~ wipes up his 
mess, throws them away. And not only that, I think you'll 
all probably agree just based on common experience that 
it's probably common for people who are accused of a crime 
to lie. It's a human reaction that if you' re accused of 
something and you want to protect yourself you lie. 
But this defendant does not just lie, he accuses. His 
lies are not just, I didn't do it, but look who else did. 
He doesn't care who might get convicted or charged as a 
result of his false statements. He does not just lie, he 
accuses. (Tr.p. 5350, ln. 9-21) 
> Mary Abitz made the very same statements that Brian Abitz 
made to the Suttons. She said the very same things. The 
Brian Abitz story, ladies and gentlemen, is a move to~ is 
a twisted, incredible and cowardly effort by the defendant 
to cast blame for his own criminal acts on a juvenile. He 
has every reason to lie about it. The bottom line of the 
defendant's statements is that they're hollow, they're self 
-serving, they're inconsistent, and they are simply untrue. 
(Tr.p. 5356, ln. 20 - p. 5357, ln. 4) 
> And the truth in this case is that Dale Shackelford 
killed Donna Fontaine and Fred Palahniuk and he did so with 
premeditation, with malice and with deliberation. He 
conspired to do so with Mary Abitz and Sonja Abitz. He 
burned their bodies to cover it up and he created false 
evidence. (Tr.p. 5357, ln. 18 - 23) 
> The person who is lying about what happened at that time 
and that location is the defendant. (Tr. p. 5422, ln. 23 -
25) . 
Based on the cumulative effect of the above, the misconduct of 
the prosecutor and the prejudice arising therefrom, the defendant 
was denied his right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the U.S. and 
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Idaho Constitutions, and all convictions in Latah County Case No. 
CR00-00260 must be vacated. 
Coupled with the allowance of impermissible hearsay several 
witnesses at trial (declared "error" by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
STATE V. SHACKELFORD, 150 Idaho 355, 247 P.3d 582 (2010)) and the 
entirely circumstantial nature of the case against Shackelford, the 
improper vouching and statements/personal opinions espoused by 
prosecutor Eckmann exacerbated the prejudice suffered by the 
defendant at trial exponentially, were clearly designed to inflame 
the passions of the jury against the defendant and were prejudicial. 
Eckmann's improper orations during trial also had a cumulative 
effect that substantially impaired Shackelford' s right to a fair 
trial, especially where the evidence against Shackelford was not 
overwhelming, and any semblance of curative instructions were 
insufficient to protect Shackelford from the prejudicial statements 
made by the prosecutor U.S. v. CONRAD, 320 F.3d 851, 856 (8th Cir. 
2003). 
Because Eckmann was not responding to any arguments made by 
defense counsel [invited response doctrine], such argument presented 
by Eckmann warrants the reversal of all convictions in this case 
(YOUNG, 470 U.S. at 13). (See also U.S. v. HERMANEK, 289 F.3d 1076 
(9th Cir. 2002)). 
F. SENTENCING BY THE COURT OF THE DEFENDANT TO A TERM OF 
(FIXED) LIFE IMPRISONMENT ON CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT FIRST 
DEGREE MURDER WITHOUT A JURY DETERMINATION OF THE FACTS 
WHICH WOULD ALLOW AN INCREASE IN THE MAXIMUM TERM OF 
IMPRISONMENT VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS AS GUARANTEED BY 
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. 
Idaho Code provides that a defendant convicted of conspiracy 
" shall be punishable upon conviction in the same 
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manner and to the same extent as is provided under the laws 
of the State of Idaho for the punishment of the crime or 
offense that each combined to commit." (I.C.18-1701) 
(emphasis added.) 
It is clear then having been cted of Conspiracy to 
Commit First Degree Murder, where a sentence of death was available, 
and there [was] a requirement that the fact (tor) s upon which the 
determination of punishment were to be made were required to have 
been made by a jury, that Shackelford had the right to a jury 
determination of facts which increased his exposure to a sentence 
greater than ten (10) years to Life on the Conspiracy conviction as 
well. RING v. ARIZONA, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2848 (2002), APPRENDI 
v. NEW JERSEY. 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000). 
Idaho Code §19-2515 (5) provides that a defendant convicted of 
first degree murder (where a Notice to Seek the Death Penalty was 
properly/timely filed) is entitled to a special sentencing 
proceeding. If, at that special sentencing proceeding the existence 
of a statutory aggravating factor can not be unanimously established 
by the jury, the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed 
is ten (10) years to life (I.C.19-2515(7) (c)) Because Shackelford 
was required to be sentenced "in the same manner" and to the "same 
extent" as with the [underlying] First Degree Murder convictions, 
such a special sentencing proceeding was required to have been held, 
and any facts used to increase the sentence from 10 to life (to 
fixed life as imposed by the court) was required. STATE v. 
SHACKELFORD, 150 Idaho 355, 247 P. 3d 582 (2010). Petitioner 
specifically and unequivocally states that a jury could not have 
unanimously found the existence of any of the statutory aggravators 
provided by statute which would have allowed a sentence exceeding 
ten years to life. 
The State filed a Notice to Seek the Death Penalty in 
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1 
Shackelford' s case on each of the First Degree Murder counts, as 
we 1 as the Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder. In dicta, the 
court, during the sentencing of Shackelford, stated the following: 
On the conspiracy to commit murder, 
argument made by the State at the time of 
recommendations to withdraw the request for 
death for that charge and I impose 
imprisonment for that. 
I construe the 
the sentencing 
the penalty of 
a fixed life 
(Tr.p. 5999, ln. 22 p. 6000, ln. 2) 4 Despite the Court 1 s 
"interpretation 11 that the state had in fact withdrawn the Notice to 
Seek the Death Penalty on the Conspiracy to Commit First Degree 
Murder count, there is no motion, notice, document or other indicia 
or data in the record wherein the state expressed a desire to 
withdraw the Notice, thus, the Notice had not been factually, 
properly or procedurally withdrawn, and was still in effect at the 
time of sentencing. Shackelford therefore maintained the right of 
the jury determination of the existence of statutorily enumerated 
aggravating factors which would allow a sentence greater than 10 to 
life being imposed. The considerably increased sentence of ( fixed) 
life imprisonment as pronounced by the court without jury findings 
was, and continues to be, in violation of Shackelford's Sixth 
amendment rights in that the judge alone found the functional, 
equivalent of an element of a greater offense which allowed the 
increase in sentence. RING V. ARIZONA; BLAKELY v. WASHINGTON, 542 
U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004)). 
Based on the above, the Court must vacate the sentence of 
(fixed) life, and resentence Shackelford to a term not less than 10 
4 Petitioner theorizes that the Court was referring to a statement made by the 
state that requested the "maximum [sentence) that's authorized by law" on each 
conviction. Prosecutor Eckmann obviously misspoke, asking only for a life sentence 
on this capital crime, when the possible maximum sentence on the Conspiracy to 
Commit Murder was death (Tr.p.5994. In. 21 - p.5995, ln. 2). 
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years, not to exceed life, or initiate a special sentencing 
G. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF POST-CONVICTION/UNIFIED 
APPELLATE COUNSEL DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW. 
In Idaho, the right of appeal is statutory ( Idaho Code § 19-
2801; STATE v. ANDERSON, 83 Idaho 263, 361 P.2d 787 (1961)). 
Further, judges are not required to second-guess reasonable, 
professional judgments of [appellate] counsel, nor to impose upon 
appointed counsel a duty to raise every colorable claim suggested by 
a client JONES v. BARNES, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308 (1983). 
In this case, Shackelford argues that [appellate] counsel's 
failures to investigate, research or consider valid, colorable 
claims upon which relief sought herein might have been granted did 
not comport with the minimum standards of professional judgment 
required of counsel, and was not within the range of competence 
demanded of attorneys by the courts McMANN V. RICHARDSON, 397 U.S. 
759, 90 S. Ct. 1441 ( 1970) . This is especially egregious in Idaho 
where capital-case appeal and post conviction counsel are required 
to be specially trained, experienced and held to a much higher 
standard than non-capital qualified counsel (Idaho Criminal Rule 
44. 3) . 
Coupled with the ambiguity of which claims could be raised in 
which proceeding (i.e., §19-2719, unified appeal, §19-4901, etc.) 
counsel had "put off" raising various claims with the understanding 
that the claim(s) would (only) be cogniizable in the "next" phase of 
review. When Shackelford attempted to raise claims pro se because 
(post-conviction) counsel failed to raise [them] , this court 
precluded Shackelford from filing prose claims at all. Further, in 
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that post-conviction counsel filed several claims upon which should 
have been granted to the Petitioner, albeit late in the post-
conviction relief process, this Court refused to review them, 
stating that they were imely] , thus, [post-conviction] counsel 
would necessarily have been ineffective during that critical phase 
of proceedings STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 
2052 (1984). 
Petitioner hereby reserves the right to amend, supplement and 
augment this claim as necessary upon the appointment of counsel in 
this case. This Court was advised that a successive petition for 
post conviction relief would likely be necessary due to this Court's 
ORDER filed on March 10, 2005, denying Petitioner's Motion to File a 
Second Addendeum to the Third Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief where the claims, raised for the first time, were not ruled 
upon by the Court. 
Petitioner specifically avers that but for the errors as set 
forth herein, the results of the trial on all counts in Case No. 
CR00-00260 would have been different, in favor of the Defendant 
(Petitioner). 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests this Court to vacate the 
convictions on all counts in Latah County Case No. CR00-00260. 
Respectfully submitted this day of 
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I hereby verify that the material facts as contained herein are 
true and correct to best of my knowledge and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before 
SEAL 
JAMES G. QUlNN 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
$TATS Of IDAKO 
Commission 
Dale C. Shackelford 
Petitioner, prose 
me this 3 fC~ay of Dec{? '1/1/&r. 20.l..2 
~flc()~ 
Notary Public/2 
Expires, 2/io ;zor9 
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on 
affim1 the following: 
l. The bullet seen as a metallic foreign body on radiographs Victim A, the regio_n of 
the neck, is defonned and appears to have been shea.rcd off. No smaJ1er bullet fragments 
are in this region. 
2. It is unlikely that this deformity could have occurred in the cervical spine without 
substantial damage to the vertebrae or fragmentation of the bullet. 
3. The cause of the deformity and shearing is not evident on the radiographs and may 
have been caused by ricochet off a hard object prior to entry into tl1e body. 
, ~C() ,.__ 
Roderick Saxey~ ;;:J 
DATED this 
My commission Expires: Y/..,;$-: uf 
>< 
000225 
Dale C. Shackelford 
64613 / ICC 
P.O. Box 70010 
se, ID 83707 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE C. SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. CV-2001-004272 
MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 
COMES NOW THE PETITIONER, prose, and moves this Court to 
appoint counsel in the above-styled matter. In support, Petitioner 
states: 
1. That he is unable to afford counsel to represent him in this 
matter, and that counsel has been previously appointed in this 
case; 
2. That Petitioner verily believes that the matters contained 
within the AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF would be brought by a person of sufficient means to bar; 
3. The issues contained within the AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF are complex, will require 
further research and oral arguments before this Court. 
MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL - 1 
WHEREFORE, Pei 
requested. 
r requests this Court to appoint counsel as 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify by my signature below that I have caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, MOTION TO AMEND [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF and MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL to be mailed 
(served), postage pre-paid to counsel as described below by placing 
same in the custody of prison officials for placement in the US mail, 
addressed to: 
William Thompson 
Latah County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
On this day o 
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Dale C. Shackelford 
Petitioner, prose 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 










) ______________ ) 
Case No. CV-2001-0004272 
[SP-01-00366] 
ORDER SETTING STATUS 
CONFERENCE 
It is ORDERED that a status conference be conducted by telephone conference, 
to be initiated by the Court, at 10:30 A.M., Pacific Time, on January 13, 2014. The 
Department of Correction shall notify the clerk of this court of the telephone number to 
call to join Mr. Shackelford in this hearing. 
DATED this 18th day of December 2013 .. 
Jog~te~r~ 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full, true, complete 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE 
was hand delivered to: 
William W. Thompson, Jr. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
mailed to: 
Dale C. Shackelford #64613 
PO Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
transmitted by facsimile to: 
James Quinn 
Idaho Department of Correction 
(208) 336-9715 




on this &day of December 20t:=J~. ~:::::~:..,.-
ORDER SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE - 2 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
MoscovV,Idaho 83843-0568 
(208) 883-2246 
ISB No. 2613 
I-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. CV-2001-04272 
RESPONSE TO" APPLICATION 
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF," 
"MOTION TO AMEND [SUCCESSIVE] 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION 
RELIEF,""MOTION TO APPOINT 
COUNSEL;" AND RENEWED 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
COMES NOW, the Respondent, State of Idaho, by and through the Latah County 
Prosecuting Attorney, and respectfully submits the follovVing response to the 
RESPONSE TO" APPLICATION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF","MOTION TO AMEND 
[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF," "MOTION TO 
APPOINT COUNSEL;" AND RENEWED 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION: -1-
Petitioner's "Application for Post-Conviction Relief," "Motion to Amended [Successive] 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,1' and "Motion to Appoint Counsel," all of which are 
dated December 3, 2013 (as reflected by their certificates of mailing of said date). 
Respondent further renews its prior motions for Summary Disposition. 
The history of this case has been exhaustedly outlined in numerous prior 
pleadings, and the State incorporates all of its filings and responses herein. The only 
new development is the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court has issued its opinion 
denying petitioner's most recent appeal of his resentencing, the Remittitur now having 
been issued on November 21, 2013, in Supreme Court docket no. 39398 (Latah County 
Case No. CR-2000-260). With the issuance of the Remittitur, the State respectfully 
submits that the case is now ripe for a decision on the pending motion(s) for summary 
disposition. 
In his newest filings (December 3, 2013), Petitioner largely restates prior 
arguments which he has tendered and which have been ruled upon either in the 
original post-conviction proceeding and combined appeal, or in the more recent appeal 
of the petitioner's resentencing. The only arguable new claim petition attempts to assert 
RESPONSE TO "APPLICATION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF" ,"MOTION TO AMEND 
[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF," "MOTION TO 
APPOINT COUNSEL;" AND RENEWED 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION: -2-
1 
that hasn't otherwise been raised ( or could have been raised) on appeal is a conclusory 
allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the most recent appeal. 
Wherefore, for the reasons more completely articulated in the States April 11, 
2011, "Answer to '[Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,' "May 6, 2011, 
"Motion for Summary Disposition," August 9, 2012, "Response to: Motion to Resume 
Proceedings, Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Evidentiary Hearing, Motion to 
· Take Judicial Notice and Motion to Amend [Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief," and September · 7, 2012, "Response to 'Petitioner's Motion for Summary 
Disposition of Pending Motion for Appointment of Counsel'; " the State respectively 
moves for orders of this Court denying the December 3, 2013, "Motion to Amend 
[Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" and "Motion to Appoint Counsel"; 
denying the December 3; 2013, "Application for Post-Conviction Relief" on the grounds 
that it is untimely, contains no new or different substantive allegations than those 
previously litigated (or which could have been raised on prior appeal or post-
conviction) and, as to any allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the 
RESPONSE TO" APPLICATION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF" ,"MOTION TO AMEND 
[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF," "MOTION TO 
APPOINT COUNSEL;" AND RENEWED 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION: -3-
most recent resentencing appeal, there is no factual basis alleged; and granting 
Summary Disposition denying all of Petitioner's claims. 
RESPONSE TO" APPLICATION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF" ,"MOTION TO AMEND 
[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF," "MOTION TO 
APPOINT COUNSEL;" AND RENEWED 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION: -4-
of January, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO 
"APPLICATION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF," "MOTION TO AMEND 
[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF/' "MOTION TO 
APPOINT COUNSEL," AND "RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION" 
was 
V mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
hand delivered 
__ sent by facsimile, original by mail 
to the following: 
Dale Carter Shackelford #64613 
IMSI, Unit J 
P.O. Box 51 
Boise, ID 83707 
Dated this _ _,_A__;___ day of January, 2014. 
RESPONSE TO" APPLICATION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF" ,"MOTION TO AMEND 
[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF," "MOTION TO 
APPOINT COUNSEL;" AND RENEWED 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION: -5-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
- COURT MINUTFS -
John Stegner 
District Judge 
Date: January 13, 2014 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 














Recording: Z: 3 / 2014-01-13 
Time: 10:31 A.M. 
Case Nos. CV-2001-4272 [SP-2001-366] 
(and CV-2013-1408) 
APPEARANCES: 
Petitioner participating by telephone, 
appearing pro se 
State represented by counsel, 
William W. Thompson, Jr., Prosecutor 
Subject of Proceedings: STATUS CONFERENCE by telephone conference 
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for conducting a status 
conference in CV-2001-4272, Court noted the participation of counsel and the petitioner in this 
conference call. 
Court stated for the record that the State had moved for summary disposition and it was 
the Court's inclination to hear that motion and, if it allows the case to proceed further, it would 
then appoint counsel to represent Mr. Shackelford at that time. Neither the State nor Mr. 
Shackelford had objection to proceeding in that fashion. 
Court scheduled hearing on the State's Motion for Summary Disposition and Mr. 
Shackelford's Motion for Appointment of Counsel for 9:30 A.M. on January 28, 2014. 
Colloquy was had between Court, counsel and Mr. Shackelford regarding CV-2013-1408. 
Court stated that it would hear all pending motions in both CV-2001-4272 and CV-2013-
1408 at 9:30 A.M. on January 28, 2014. Mr. Shackelford objected to hearing these cases together. 
Court stated that it had not combined the cases, but had only scheduled all pending motions in 
both cases for hearing. 







IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
Stegner 
District Judge 
Date: January 28, 2014 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 















Recording: Z: 3/2014-01-28 
Time: 9:31 A.M. 
Case Nos. CV-2001-4272 [SP-2001-366] 
and CV-2013-1408 
APPEARANCES: 
Petitioner participating by telephone, 
appearing pro se 
State represented by counsel, 
William W. Thompson, Jr., Prosecutor 
--------=====================================================-
Subject of Proceedings: MOTION HEARING by telephone conference 
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for hearing of all pending 
motions in these cases, Court noted the participation of counsel and the petitioner in this 
conference call. 
Mr. Thompson argued in support of the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal as to each 
of these two cases. 
Mr. Shackelford requested that the Court formally resume the proceedings which were 
suspended in its Order Suspending Petitioner's Successive Petition on July 8, 2011. Court 
ordered that the stay is no longer in effect. 
Mr. Shackelford argued in opposition to the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal as to 
each of these cases. 
Court stated that it would issue a written opinion. 
Mr. Shackelford requested rulings on his Motion to Amend Successive Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief in CV-2001-4272, his Motion for Appointment of Counsel; and his Motion to 
Take Judicial Notice of Underlying Criminal Conviction. 
Court indicated that it would deal first with the petitioner's Motion to Take Judicial 
Notice of Underlying Criminal Conviction. Court stated that it was not in a position to take 
judicial notice of the underlying criminal conviction, informing both Mr. Shackelford and Mr. 
Thompson that if they wish to take it up, the record must be augmented in such a way as to 




Court stated that the petitioner's Motion to Appoint Counsel hinges on whether there is a 
non-frivolous component of of matters that continues, which will be decided in this 
Court's written decision. 
Colloquy was had between Mr. Shackelford and Mr. Thompson regarding the 
petitioner's Motion to Amend Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief in CV-2001-4272, 
filed on December 6, 2013. For the reason that arguing in this case was made on the basis of the 
amended document, Court granted the motion to amend. 
Mr. Shackelford and Correction Officer James Quinn had colloquy with the Court 
regarding of method by which Mr. Shackelford received copies of discovery items. 










IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 












Case No. CV-2001-4272 [SP-2001-366] 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
AND GRANTING SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL 
BACKGROUND 
Dale Shackelford filed an Amended [Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief with this Court on December 6, 2013. He filed a motion for appointment of 
counsel on December 3, 2013. The State filed its opposition to the petition on 
January 2, 2014, referring generally to the entirety of prior proceedings and filings. 
The State has moved for summary dismissal of the petition, arguing that the issues 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
AND GRANTING SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL 1 
included in the petition are untimely, are not new, and are unsupported by any 
factual basis. 
Shackelford makes seven arguments in his petition: (i) this court erred in 
instructing the jury on accomplice liability in Instruction No. 33, (ii) ineffective 
assistance of counsel in failing to object to Instruction No. 33, (iii) the State failed to 
disclose forensic evidence to Shackelford, violating his due process rights, (iv) 
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to impeach Lucien Haag and failing to 
independently investigate forensic evidence, (v) prosecutorial misconduct in 
vouching for witness credibility, (vi) the court's sentence for the conspiracy count 
exceeded the maximum allowed·by law, and (vii) ineffective assistance ofpost-
conviction and appellate counsel. 
LAW 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates an action that is civil rather 
than criminal. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 180 P.3d 476, 482 (2008). It is 
an entirely new proceeding, distinct from the criminal action which led to the 
conviction. State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 210, 766 P.2d 678, 680 (1988). 
The doctrine of res judicata applies to post-conviction relief cases: it bars 
defendants from raising issues decided on direct criminal appeal in a subsequent 
post-conviction relief proceeding. State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 10 n. 1, 966 P.2d 1, 
10 n. 1 (1998). Any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was 
not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings. Beam, 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
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AND GRANTING SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL 2 
115 Idaho at 210, 766 P.2d at 680; I.C. § 19-4901(b). This is subject to the narrow 
exception that a new issue may be raised if it raises a substantial doubt about the 
reliability of the finding of guilt, and could not have been presented earlier. I.C. § 
19-4901(b). 
A prosecutor may not personally vouch for the credibility of witnesses. Such 
action may convey the impression that extra evidence, known to the prosecution but 
not the jury, supports the charges; the weight of the prosecutor's opinion may then 
cause the jury to simply trust the government's judgment rather than its view of the 
evidence. State v, Carson, 151 Idaho 713; 721, 264 P.3d 54, 62 (2011) (quoting U.S. 
v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985)). Nevertheless, the prosecution is free to argue 
based on the evidence and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that 
evidence. Carson, 151 Idaho at 722, 264 P.3d at 63. 
Prosecutorial vouching, even though misconduct, may evade review where 
there was no contemporaneous objection, and the defendant does not demonstrate a 
clear violation of an unwaived constitutional right. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010). 
Upon a conviction for conspiracy to commit a crime, a conspirator may be 
punished "in the same manner and to the same extent as is provided under the laws 
of the state of Idaho for the punishment of the crime or offenses that each 
[conspirator] combined to commit." I.C. § 18-1701. Where the death penalty is not 
sought, or a jury or judge does not find a statutory aggravating circumstance 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
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AND GRANTING SUMMARY 
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beyond a reasonable doubt, "the court shall impose a life sentence with a minimum 
period of confinement of not less than ten (10) years .... " § 18-4004. 
The fixed, or minimum period of confinement, may not be less than ten years, 
but may extend as far as a fixed life sentence. See State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 
484, 272 P.3d 417, 456 (2012) (trial court properly sentenced a minor, immune to 
the death penalty, to a fixed life term of imprisonment for first degree murder). The 
imposition of a fixed life sentence does require a high degree of certainty that either 
the perpetrator could never be safely released back into society, or the nature of the 
offense requires lifelong imprisonment. Id. The gravity of the offense is not an 
aggravating circumstance that must be found by a jury, but is an extension of the 
trial court's sentencing discretion. See, id.; see also, State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 
873, 253 P.3d 310 (2011) (trial court acted within its discretion to sentence minor to 
a fixed life sentence for second degree murder). 
ANALYSIS 
The Idaho Supreme Court has addressed Shackelford's arguments regarding 
Jury Instruction No. 33 in the prior direct criminal appeal. State v. Shackelford, 
150 Idaho 355, 378-79, 247 P.3d 582, 605-06 (2010). The Idaho Supreme Court 
determined that there were no errors in the jury instructions dealing with 
accomplice liability; the instructions stated the applicable law, did not mislead the 
jury, and put Shackelford on notice as to the charges against him. Id. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
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Shackelford's arguments in this petition appear to be only minor variations 
on the arguments presented on direct appeal. As a result, his claims, to the extent 
they were previously ruled upon, are barred by res judicata. Creech, 132 Idaho at 
10 n. 1, 966 P.2d at 10 n. 1. For those arguments not presented in the direct appeal, 
he has not set forth substantial doubt as to the finding of guilt that would allow him 
to assert new claims, including that relative to Instruction No. 33 in this post-
conviction petition. LC. § 19-490l(b). Shackelford was able to complain regarding 
some aspects of Instruction No. 33 on direct appeal, and there is no explanation why 
the current arguments were not raised then. Because these new arguments could 
have been raised on direct appeal and were not, they are now barred in the post-
conviction relief action. Beam, 115 Idaho at 210, 766 P.2d at 680. 
Even were this Court to proceed to the merits, Shackelford's arguments are 
in error. Shackelford claims that Idaho recognizes principals and accessories, but 
rejects accomplice liability theory. Shackelford fails to comprehend that principals 
and accessories are subsets of accomplice liability theory. Furthermore, 
Shackelford's claim that the evidence did not support the accomplice liability 
instruction is factually inaccurate; substantial amounts of testimony at trial 
demonstrated that Shackelford advised and encouraged others to murder Donna 
Fontaine, as the Idaho Supreme Court noted on direct appeal. Shackelford, 150 
Idaho 366-70, 247 P.3d at 593-97. In addition, the existence of a conspiracy 
showed that Shackelford worked with others to bring about the murders, which 
clearly implicates the relevance of accomplices and supports the submission of 
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Instruction No. 33 to the j:ury. State v. Holder, 100 Idaho 129, 131-32, 594 P.2d 
639, 641-42 (1979) overruled on other grounds, State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 
8 P.3d 652 (2000). 
Shackelford asserts claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 
claiming that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to Shackelford 
in his criminal case. He claims that x-ray examinations of the remains of one victim 
and examinations of one bullet's mass after it was recovered from those remains 
show that its mass was significantly lower than expected. Shackelford claims that 
the reduction in mass corresponds to a bullet ricochet that is inconsistent with the 
State's theory of an execution-style murder. 
The Idaho Supreme Court previously addressed other Brady claims by 
Shackelford in the direct criminal appeal. Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 379-81, 247 
P.3d at 606-08. The evidence presented there dealt with Dr. Cihak's estimations of 
the time of death, nevertheless the Idaho Supreme Court determined that 
Shackelford had failed to show a reasonable probability of a different result. 
Shackelford's arguments here suffer from the same failure. 
The low mass of the bullet could be inconsistent with the prosecution's theory 
of one of the murders. Nevertheless, this single bare fact fails to raise a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome-the victim was shot twice, not only with a bullet 
entering the back of her neck, but also with a shotgun blast to her chest. The mass 
of the bullet, found in the victim's remains after a fire, would not have changed the 
outcome of the trial, even if it were inconsistent with the prosecution's theory. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
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Furthermore, Shackelford was previously able to raise Brady claims in the 
underlying appeal about other evidence, he offers no reason why these new 
claims were not also presented at that time. clearly raised issues 
regarding the forensic evidence, but did not argue at all regarding the inconsistent 
mass of the bullet. As a result, Shackelford's claims regarding this evidence are 
barred, because they could previously have been raised on appeal, but were not. 
Beam, 115 Idaho at 210, 766 P.2d at 680. 
Shackelford also claims that he was deprived of effective assistance of trial 
counsel when trial counsel did not impeach Lucien Haag and did not independently 
review evidence regarding the mass of the bullet. As before, Shackelford argued 
similar points in his prior criminal appeal. Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 384, 247 P.3d 
at 611. Nevertheless, there was no mention of the low mass bullet or Lucien Haag, 
and as a result this claim is also barred. Shackelford was certainly able to make 
these arguments on his prior appeal, and offers no explanation as to why he did not 
address the low mass bullet and Lucien Haag's testimony at that time. Beam, 115 
Idaho at 210, 766 P.2d at 680. 
Shackelford claims the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for the State's 
witnesses during closing arguments. While there is some suggestion that the 
prosecutor vouched for witnesses, most of the offending statements cited by 
Shackelford recited evidence produced at trial and premised the credibility of the 
witnesses on their consistency with the evidence. Thus it appears that the 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
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AND GRANTING SUMMARY 
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prosecution's closing arguments were permissibly based upon reasonable inferences 
arising from the evidence presented. 
Shackelford contends that his due process rights to a fair trial were 
violated by cumulative error. Although he claims that the prosecutor's vouching 
was overwhelmingly prejudicial, he fails to demonstrate that the statements were a 
clear violation of his constitutional rights under State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 
P.3d 961 (2010) (declining to find reversible error where there was no 
contemporaneous objection and no showing of a clear violation of constitutional 
rights by the alleged fundamental error). The purported vouching does not 
demonstrate a systemic problem with the trial that would cause this Court to 
question the reliability of the finding of guilt. Additionally Shackelford's failure to 
raise this issue on the prior appeal again bars his claim here. Beam, 115 Idaho at 
210, 766 P.2d at 680. 
Shackelford claims that the sentence imposed for the conspiracy count, a 
fixed life sentence, exceeds the statutory maximum. Shackelford's sentence, a fixed 
life term, clearly exceeds the statutory minimum set by LC. § 18-4004; however, it 
is no way impermissible. For first degree murder, the court "shall impose a life 
sentence with a minimum period of confinement not less than ten (10) years .... " 
LC. § 18-8004. The logical inference is that a life sentence may be imposed with a 
minimum period of confinement greater than ten years. This would include a term 
of imprisonment up to a fixed life term. A fixed life sentence is compatible with the 
statutory sentencing scheme for conspiracy to commit first degree murder. See 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
AND GRANTING SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL 8 
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 484, 272 P.3d at 456 (in which the Supreme Court 
upheld a fixed life sentence for first degree murder). Conspiracy to commit first 
degree murder carries same 
murder. LC.§ 18-1701. Shackelford's argument is further undermined by the fact 
that even a second degree murder conviction allows for a fixed life term to be 
imposed. See, Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 253 P.3d 310. 
Shackelford notes that the State withdrew its notice to seek the death 
penalty in this case. He argues that the State should not be able to "unring the 
bell" of seeking the death penalty, and that he is entitled to a special proceeding by 
a jury on the aggravating circumstances. However, Shackelford fails to 
demonstrate prejudice. Under LC.§ 18-4004 there are two ways a defendant may 
avoid the death penalty: Either the State does not seek the death penalty, or the 
jury fails to find aggravating circumstances. In either case Shackelford has avoided 
the death penalty. In addition, the minimum sentence available, life with a 
minimum period of confinement of 10 years, remains the same. Shackelford has 
received a sentence which would be allowed if the jury were to find in his favor in 
such a special proceeding. As a result, the special proceeding would be pointless, 
since it would not impact his sentence. Therefore, Shackelford's arguments on his 
conspiracy sentence are without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
None of Shackelford's claims can succeed as a matter of law. He has not 
made a showing necessary to either have counsel appointed or to secure an 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
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evidentiary hearing. As a result, the State's motion for summary dismissal is 
appropriate and should be granted. 
For the reasons stated above and good cause appearing, 
It is ORDERED that Shackelford's motion for court appointed counsel is 
DENIED. LC.§ 19-852(2)(c). 
It is FURTHER ORDERED, that the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal 
of the Amended [Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed by the 
Petitioner, Dale Carter Shackelford, is GRANTED. 
Dated this_]_ ~fMarch 2014. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
AND GRANTING SUMMARY 
Jo R. Stegner 
District Judge 
DISMISSAL 10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete, and correct copies of the foregoing 
order were delivered to: 
Dale C. Shackelford #64613 
PO Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
William W. Thompson, Jr. 
Prqsecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
James Quinn 




[.__} U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[-1 Hand Delivery 
J-W, U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
· ,1:.-t Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
On this / D day of March 2014. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
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AND GRANTING SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL 11 
· ., 1 J.j__.Q_ I .J · "- 4/} ,. ) 
, 'j ~ L)( __ ,'\ \ Cx_X...1 '----··6 V~ 
l -
Deputy Clerk 
Dale Carter Shackelford 
#64613 I ICC 
Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
Appellant. 
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IN THE DTSTRTCT COURT OF TJ:fE S~COND JUD!C!AL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH. 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner - Appellant, 
v. 
















Case No. CV-2001-4272 
S.Ct. Docket No. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Post Conviction 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, THE PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY OF LATAH COUNTY AND CLERK OF THE ABOVE-TITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
2 I riH ff: 02 
l ). The above-named appellant appeals against the above-named respondem ru the Idaho Supreme 
Court from the judgment entered in the above--titied action on the Th day of March. :ZO J 4. the 
Honorable John R. Stegner presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
2). The appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment descried 
paragraph l above is appealable under and pursuant to I.A.R. Rule 1 l(a) (1). 
3). A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal appears below which the appellant intends 
to assert on the appeal, however said list of issues shall not prevent the appellant from asserting other 
issues at a later date. 
(a). DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF THE 
(AMENDED) PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF? 
(b). DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL? 
4). There is a portion of the record (in the underlying criminal case) that has been sealed, 
specifically, the Pre-Sentence Investigation (PSI) report. 
5). Appellant requests the preparation of the entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in 
I.A.R. 25(a). 
6). Appellant requests the standard Clerk's Record pursuant to I.A.R. 28(b )(2), The appellant 
requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's Record, in addition to those 
automatically included under I.A.R. 28(b )(2): 
(a). Any briefs or memorandum, filed or lodged, by the state, the appellant or the court in 
support of, or in opposition to, the dismissal of the post-conviction petition; 
(b). Any motions or responses, including all attachments, affidavits or copies of transcripts, 
filed or lodged by the state, the appellant or the court in support of, or in opposition to, the dismissal of 
the post-conviction petition; and 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
(c). Any items from the underlying criminal case of which the court takes, or has taken judicial 
notice, including, but not limited to trial transcripts in Latah County Case No. CR2000-00260, original 
post-conviction proceedings (record) in Latah County Case Nos. CV-2001-004272; and CV-2013-1408. 
I certify that: 
7). A copy of this NOTICE OF APPEAL has been served on the Reporter; 
8). That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the preparation of the record 
because the appellant has been declared indigent; 
9). That there is no filing fee for a Notice of Appeal filed on a Post-Conviction Relief 
judgment; 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~-~ 
Dale Carter Shackelford 
Petitioner - Appellant 
I certify by my signature below that I have mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF APPEAL upon the Reporter and upon the Office of the Prosecuting Attorney by mailing 
same, postage pre-paid, via the institutional legal mail system to: 
William Thompson 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 'joCpQ 
Moscow, ID 83843 
} d1"'--0n this __ 't ____ day of 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
Latah County Reporter 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box ?S~1.,§I:, 
Moscow, ID 83843 
------------, 2014. 
~~~~/~-~µ 
Dale Carter Shackelford 
#64613 / ICC 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83 707 
Appellant 
Dale Carter Shackelford 
#64613 I ICC 
Box 70010 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner - Appellant, 
v. 
















Case No. CV-2013-1408 AND 
CV-2001-4272 
S.Ct. Docket No. -----
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT 
OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL FROM 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF. 
COMES NOW THE PETITIONER - APPELLANT, pro se, and moves this Court to appoint 
counsel in the appeal of the above-styled action. In support, Petitioner -Appellant (Appellant) states as 
follows: 
1 ). That Appellant is incarcerated, and that the Idaho Department of Correction does not 
provide, or allow prisoners the option of viewing or even purchasing case law (opinions) in the legal 
resource center( s) located at the various prisons within the state. Further, the legal resource center( s) do 
not carry or provide access to many of the Idaho Codes (statutes), and there are no annotated copies of 
Rules Civil/Criminal Procedure, Idaho Appellate Rules, Rules of Evidence, etc. (Federal or State). 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL FROM SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
OF PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 1 
2). Appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal with this court and seeks to address issues and 
procedural matters which are far beyond his ability to adequately present in the format( s) required by 
Appellate Rules and the Idaho Supreme Court. 
3). The issues and matters to be included within the appeal from this Court's granting the State's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal are complex, and almost procedurally indecipherable. Counsel 
appointment would benefit judicial economy, assist in adequately preserving cognizable issues, and 
advance jurisprudence within the state. 
4). Appellant has been granted in forma pauperis status, and remains unable to afford counsel 
to represent him in the matters on appeal from this Court's rulings. 
WHEREFO. RJf, Appell.ant prays this Court appoint and assign coun. sel as re u~st d. 
U- ~ ;h ~ "' 
On this day of \-~ft{ , 2014 ~;'u;,~ '"'"«"J 
:).v rv Dale Carter Shackelford 
#64613 I ICC 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
Appellant. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify by my signature below that I have mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
upon the Office of the Prosecuting Attorney by mailing same, postage pre-paid, via the institutional 
legal mail system to: 
William Thompson 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
,-'b ~~~ ,-
' ,? !)r- \__ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 












Case No. CV-2001-4272 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
COUNSEL ON APPEAL 
On March 7, 2014, this Court dismissed Dale Shackelford's Application for 
Post-Conviction Relief on a Motion for Summary Disposition by the State. 
Shackelford filed a Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court on March 21, 2014. 
He then filed with this Court a Motion for Appointment of Counsel on Appeal From 
Summary Disposition on April 7, 2014. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
ON APPEAL 1 
The determination of whether or not counsel should be appointed in a 
particular post-conviction proceeding is discretionary. LC. § 19-4904. 
Good cause appearing, 
It is ORDERED that the Motion for Appointment of Counsel On Appeal From 
Summary Dismissal of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is GRANTED, and the State 
Appellate Public Defender is appointed as Shackelford's post-conviction appellate 
counsel. LC.§ 19-4904. 
Dated this f :::J.-!:;:f July 2014. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
2~,c~ 
John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
ON APPEAL 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete, and correct copies of the foregoing 
were delivered to: 
Dale C. Shackelford #64613 
PO Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
William W. Thompson, Jr. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
James Quinn 




State Appellate Public Defender 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Ste. 100 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
. rHt' 
On this LL day of July 2014. 
[Au.s. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ VFax 
[ Vl Hand Delivery 
[. J U.S. Mail 
[ ] pvernight Mail 
[ v('Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ~ ~ -LN~u_c{ 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[/]/U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
ON APPEAL 3 
In the Supreme Court of the S!;!t,! ?V~i~10 ,i.;;n ;a 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
V. 




) ORDER REMANDING TO DISTRICT 
) COURT FOR FINAL JUDGMENT 
) 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 42331-2014 
) Latah County No. 2001-4272 
) 
) 
This Appeal is from the ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
COUNSEL AND GRANTING SUMMARY DISMISSAL file stamped in District Court on March 
7, 2014. It appears that a final judgment has yet to be entered by the District Court in compliance 
with I.R.C.P. 54(a); therefore, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the NOTICE OF APPEAL be, and hereby is, 
SUSPENDED; however, the Appellant must obtain a final judgment from District Court within 
twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order, if Appellant cannot obtain a final judgment within 
twenty-one (21) days, Appellant shall file a RESPONSE with this Court as to why a final judgment 
was not entered. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that proceedings in this appeal shall be SUSPENDED 
until further notice. ~· 
DATED this~ day of July, 2014. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Judge 
ORDER REMANDING TO DISTRICT COURT FOR FINAL JUDGMENT Docket No. 42331-
2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 












Case No. CV-2001-4272 
[SP-2001-366] 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: Dale Shackelford's 
Petition is DISMISSED with prejudice. 
~ 
DATED this 2'-f day of July 2014. 
JUDGMENT 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete, and correct copies of the 
foregoing order were delivered 
PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY: 
Dennis Benjamin 
PO Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83702 
RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY: 
'William vV. Thompson, Jr. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
v U.S. Mail 
E-Mail: db(a)nbrnlaw.corn 
Fax: 








P.O. Box 2772 
303 W. Bannock 




Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant 
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IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE ECOND JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND OR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 











CASE NO. CV-2001-4272 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, St te of Idaho, AND ITS ATTORNEY, the 
Latah County Prosecutor, AND THE CLERK OF HE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, Dale Shae elford, appeals against the above named 
Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the al judgment denying Appellant's petition for 
post-conviction relief, entered in the above entitled action on the 24th day of July, 2014, the 
Honorable John R. Stegner, presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to th Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appeala e orders under and pursuant to Rule l l(a)(l) 
I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal is listed below which the Appellant 
then intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any s ch list of issues on appeal shall not prevent 
the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal 
1 • AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
ORIGINAL 
Sep 08 2014 3:4 7PM Nevin Ben jamin,McK- · ,&Bart 208 345 827 4 page "' 
.. Did the Court err in denying Petitioner's ~otion for appointment of counsel? 
I 
• Did the Court err in summarily dismissing the petition? 
4. No order sealing any portion of the recor has been issued. 
5. Transcript: 
(a) A reporter's transcript is request d. 
(b) The Appellant requests the prep ation of the following portions 
of the reporter's transcript in both h d copy and electronic format: 
• Motion hearing on O 1/16/2013 at 9 30 a.m. 
Court Reporter: Sheryl L. Engler 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pa es: less than 20 pages 
• Motion hearing on 01/13/2014 at 1 :30 am. 
Court Reporter: Sheryl L. Engler 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pa es: less than 20 pages 
• Motion hearing on 01/28/2014 at 9 30 a.m. 
Court Reporter: Sheryl L. Engler 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pa es: less than 40 pages 
6. The Appellant requests the following do uments to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included pursuant t Rule 28, LA.R: 
• 03/18/2011 Motion to Disqualify udge for Cause 
• 03/18/2011 Affidavit of Dale C. 
• 03/18/2011 
• 04/11/2011 e] Petition for Post- Conviction Relief' 
• 04/20/2011 Order DENYJNG M ion to Disqualify Judge 
• 04/25/2011 Petitioner's Reply to tate's Answer to Successive Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief 
2 • AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 




Order Denying Petitioner's jotion for Appointment of Counsel 
Motion Summary Dispos1-bon 
Motion for Reconsideration 
• 05/31/2011 Motion for Leave to File Ad endum to Successive Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief 
• 07/08/2011 Order DENYING Petitioner' Motion for Reconsideration 
• 07/08/2011 Order SUSPENDING Petitio er's [Successive] Petition, Denying his 
Motion for Leave to File Addendum, and D ying the State's Motion for Summary . 
Disposition 
• 02/03/2012 Motion for Review by Distri t Court of Proposed Stipulation 
• 07/11/2012 Motion to Amend (Successi ) Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
• 07/11/2012 Amended (Successive) Petiti n for Post-Conviction Relief 
• 07/11/2012 Notice of Withdrawal of Pro osed Stipulations 
• 07/11/2012 Motion for Appointment of ounsel and Evidentiary Hearing on Post 
Conviction Petition 
• 07/11/2012 
• 08/09/2012 Response to Motion to Res e Proceedings, Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel and Evidentiary Hearing, Motion t Take Judicial Notice and Motion to Amend 
[Successive] Petition for Post Conviction R lief 
• 09/04/2012 Petitioner's Motion for Sum ary Disposition of Pending Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel 
• 09/07/2012 Response to Petitioner's Mof on for Summary Disposition of Pending 
Motion for Appointment of Counsel 
• 11/18/2013 Notice of Withdrawal of Peti ioner's Motion to Amend Successive Petition 
for Post Conviction Relief 
• 12/06/2013 Motion to Amend [Successivr] Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
3 • AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL I 
Sep 08 2014 3:4 7PM Nevin Ben jamin,McK.w&Bart 208 345 827 4 page ') 
i 
" 12/06/2013 Amended [Successive] Petititn for Post Conviction Relief Filed 
• 12/06/2013 Motion to Appoint Counsel 
i 
• 01/02/2014 Response to Application for tost Conviction Relief, Motion to Amend 
[Successive) Petition for Post Conviction R1lief, Motion to Appoint Counsel, and 
Renewed Motion for Summary Disposition 
• 01/28/2014 Court Minutes 
• 03/07/2014 Order Denying Motion for A pointment of Counsel and Granting 
Summary Dismissal 
• 03/21/2014 Notice of Appeal 
• 04/23/2014 Motion for Appointment of ounsel on Appeal from Summary Dismissal 
of Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
• 06/23/2014 Letter from Dale Shackelfor 
• 06/23/2014 Objection to Clerk's Certific e 
• 07 / 17/2014 Order Granting Motion for Abpointment of Counsel on Appeal 
• 07I18/2014 Letter from Dale Shackelforj 
• 07/24/2014 S.C. - Order Remanding to Jstrict Court for Final Judgment 
• 07/24/2014 Judgment: DISMISSED wit~prejudice 
7. The Appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the suf reme Court: 
• All exhibits offered and/or admitted at any hearing. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of app al has been served on each reporter of whom 
a transcript has been requested as n ed below at the address set out below: 
Sheryl L. EngJer, Latah County Co house, P.O. Box 8068, Moscow, ID 83843. 
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(b) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because 
the Court has previously found him to be indigent. 
( c) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because the Court has previously found him to be 
indigent. 
(d) That Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because there is 
no filing fee for post-conviction petitions and because the Court has previously 
found him to be indigent. , 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 (and the attorney general ofldaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho 
Code). 
DATED THIS3:"f1-\ day of September, 2014. 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Dale Shackelford 
5 • AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on September8-1 , 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the 




to: Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
P .0. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83.~43 
Sheryl L. Engler 
Official Court Reporter 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Criminal Law Division 
Capital Litigation Unit 
P .0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
~'-'~ ~o t~-.... 
Dennis Benjamin 
6 • AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
P.O. Box 8372 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 
-I 
LATAH COUNTY NO. CV-2001-4272 
DOCKET NO. 42331-2014 
( 
I Dale Carter Shackelford, Petitioner/ Appellant V. 
f State of Idaho , 
( Respondent. 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
12: 
Notice is hereby given that on October 1, 2014, I lodged in person 
a transcript consisting of a total of 8 pages for the following proceeding: 
Petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings - January 16, 2013 
with the District Court Clerk of the County of Latah in the Second Judicial 
District. 
The following transcripts were previously lodged with the Supreme Court on 
September 4, 2014: 
Status Conference - January 13, 2014 
Motion Hearing-January 28, 2014 
Also, I sent to by e-mail a copy of the same transcript to 
sctfil ings@idcourts.net. 
<~ ._,,-..____,,_ 
Sheryl L. E 
10/1/14 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, 
vs. 















I, Ranae Converse, Deputy Court Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Latah, do hereby certify that the 
Transcript of the Petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings by Telephone Conference 
held on January 16, 2013, in accordance with the Appellate Rules will be lodged as an 
exhibit as provided by Rule 31(a)(3), IAR. 
. IN WITNESS WHERE?F,) hjXe hereun~~ s~\ mr .,hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Moscow, Idaho th1s~'ctay of (Ltc}1.J[Y!/l I 
Susan R. Petersen, Clerk of the 
District Court, Latah County, ID 
Deputy Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE RE: EXHIBITS - 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, 
vs. 












Supreme Court Case No. 42331-2014 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
_________ ) 
I, Ranae Converse, Deputy Court Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Latah, do hereby certify that the 
clerk's record in the above entitled cause and will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Moscow, Idaho this 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1 
Susan R. Petersen, Clerk of the 
District Court, Latah County, ID 
By ~-V-4,A,~~--l 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, 
vs. 










) _________ ) 
Supreme Court Case No. 42331-2014 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ranae Converse, Deputy Court Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Latah, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by United 
States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the attorneys of record in this cause as follows: 
DENNIS BENJAMIN 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 WEST BANNOCK 




BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
IN WITNE_S~
1
\-Ytt~REOF, I h¥i~ ht?~unto set ~y hand and affixed the seal of said Court at 
Moscow, Idaho this _li!aay of {J; /' ttJ UVl , 20Ltf 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Susan R. Petersen, Clerk of the 
District Court, Latah County, ID 
Deputy Clerk 
